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Abstract
Contracting frictions affect the organization of firms, but how much does this matter on
the aggregate level? This paper studies how costly supplier contract enforcement shapes
the patterns of intermediate input use and quantifies the impact of these distortions
on aggregate productivity and welfare. Using the frequency of litigation between US
firms to measure the potential for hold-up problems, I find a robust relationship between
countries’ input-output structure and their quality of legal institutions: in countries with
high enforcement costs, firms have lower expenditure shares on intermediate inputs in
sector pairs where US firms litigate frequently for breach of contract. I adapt a Ricardian
trade model to the study of intersectoral trade, and show that the variation in intermediate
input shares that is explained by contracting frictions is large enough to generate sizeable
welfare increases when enforcement institutions are improved.
Countries differ vastly in the speed and cost of formal contract enforcement: while Icelandic
courts often resolve commercial disputes within a few months, cases in India that are decades
old are commonplace.1 A large and prominent literature has argued that these institutional
frictions constitute transaction costs between firms, which affect their organizational choice and
intermediate input sourcing decision (Williamson, 1985), and potentially even the pattern of
development (North, 1990). The logic goes as follows: if enforcement of supplier contracts is
costly or impossible, firms will perform a larger part of the production process in-house, instead
of outsourcing it, thereby avoiding having to contract with an external supplier. Compared to
a world with good enforcement, firms will have a lower expenditure on externally sourced in-
termediate inputs, and a higher cost of production. Higher production costs then feed into
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higher input prices in downstream sectors, thus amplifying the distortions on the macroeco-
nomic scale.2 While these Coasian transaction costs are widely acknowledged to determine
firm-level outcomes such as the organization of production, we know little about whether they
really matter for the aggregate economy and the level of development.
This paper studies the quantitative importance of legal institutions and imperfect contract
enforcement for aggregate outcomes using tools from quantitative trade theory, together with
data on contract enforcement costs and intermediate input expenditure shares across coun-
tries. I start by showing a set of correlations between industries’ bilateral intermediate input
expenditure shares, as observed in Input-Output tables, and the degree of contracting frictions
between them— which I measure, similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998), as the product of the
country’s quality of contract enforcement in courts, and the industries’ bilateral dependence on
formal contract enforcement. To measure this dependence on formal enforcement, I construct
an index of observed litigation between firms from two sectors using microdata on US case law:
firms will only go to court when there is no other way to resolve hold-up problems, and this is
when the quality of courts matters. The stylized fact that emerges is that in countries where
the enforcement of supplier contracts in courts is more costly, intermediate input expenditure
shares are lower in sector-pairs where litigation (in the US) is more prevalent: enforcement
institutions are not only correlated with the sectoral specialization of countries, but also with
the input mix used to produce in each of them. Since my measure of firm’s dependence on
enforcement is a bilateral (sector-pair-specific) measure, I can include fixed effects for upstream
sectors × countries, and thereby control for a vast amount of industry characteristics that may
be confounding the role of frictions in buyer-supplier relationships. This strategy allows me to
separate the role of legal institutions in the enforcement of buyer-supplier contracts from its role
in the provision of financing. The resulting patterns can be explained by theories where buyers
of relationship-specific goods can hold up their suppliers, and where enforcement of contracts
in a court is a solution to the hold-up problem as long as courts are sufficiently good.
These regressions are not getting at the causal effect of contracting frictions on input use,
not least because the amount of litigation observed will depend on the quality of courts and
on the possibility to use informal ways to enforce contracts, e.g. through relational contracts.
In order to interpret the observed correlation and to perform counterfactuals, I construct a
general-equilibrium model of domestic intersectoral trade. For each step in the production pro-
cess, firms face the decision between performing it in-house using labor, which is frictionless,
or outsourcing it to an external supplier, in which case they may benefit from a lower cost
draw but are subject to contracting frictions that distort the cost of sourcing. These frictions
are transaction costs in the spirit of Coase and Williamson. Hence, intermediate input shares
are determined by the relative productivity under in-house production and under outsourc-
ing, and by bilateral contracting frictions. This relationship resembles a gravity equation in
2Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) show that institutional quality affects comparative advantage of a
country through this channel; see also the handbook chapter by Nunn and Trefler (2014). The idea of a
’multiplier effect’ of intermediate input linkages goes back to Hirschman (1958), with more recent applications
to development patterns by Ciccone (2002), and Jones (2011a,b).
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international trade: contracting frictions reduce intermediate input shares in a similar way to
how iceberg trade costs reduce international trade shares. The resulting equation is hence the
structural (nonlinear) counterpart to the reduced-form regressions from before: when frictions
are large, firms perform a larger range of tasks in-house, resulting in lower expenditure shares
on externally sourced intermediate inputs.3 Using results from theories of hold-up in bilateral
buyer-supplier relationships and using the data on litigation between US firms, I identify the
role of contract enforcement costs in shaping contracting frictions. The key idea behind the
identification is that for a given level of institutional quality, litigation will only be observed
when formal contracts (where parties have the option to enforce it in a court) are preferable over
informal ones (where product-specific attributes such as the degree of relationship-specificity
entirely determine incentives in the relationship). This relationship allows me to use the lit-
igation data to estimate the distortions under formal and informal contracting, and in turn
to estimate the parameters of the gravity equation for intersectoral trade. I then study the
importance of contract enforcement institutions for aggregate welfare by simulating the model
under counterfactually low enforcement costs.
The exercise reveals that supplier contracting frictions distort intermediate input use to an
extent that makes them relevant on the macroeconomic scale: even under the most conservative
specifications, many countries would see their output grow by between two and ten percent if
they had access to the enforcement institutions of the United States. The sectors that would
benefit the most are those where intangible inputs and relationship-specific components are an
important part of the production process: improvements in contracting institutions would allow
firms to outsource these tasks and components to specialized suppliers. These improvements,
however, need to be large enough to push firms to adopt formal contracting relationships: as
long as firms prefer informal “gentlemen’s agreements” over formally enforceable contracts, a
marginal improvement in court quality will have no effect. The effects that I estimate are due
to the improved contracting between buyers and sellers alone; they are not due to better access
to financing or due to other benefits from improved legal institutions.
This paper is related to several different literatures. The first is the literature on legal
institutions and trade, and includes, among others, contributions by Nunn (2007), Levchenko
(2007), Costinot (2009), and Chor (2010), who show that legal institutions determine countries’
industry mix and comparative advantage. In contrast, I provide direct evidence that each
industry’s mix of inputs is distorted by poor enforcement; these distortions then increase the
cost of production. The distinction is not only of interest by itself, but also has implications
3Strictly speaking, input-output tables are constructed at the plant level, and within-firm across-plant trans-
actions are part of the observed cost shares (through recent work by Atalay et al. (2014) using US data shows
that most vertical flows are across-firm rather than within-firm). The estimated welfare gains in this paper
depend on the difference in frictions in the plants’ use of primary factors and the use of intermediate inputs
that is explained by the quality of enforcement institutions. If both are distorted, then our estimates would un-
derestimate the true importance of enforcement costs. If some intermediate input use is not subject to hold-ups
(perhaps because the transactions are intra-firm), that decreases the welfare gains from reducing enforcement
costs that we estimate through the decrease in explanatory power of enforcement costs. Hence, for the esti-
mation of the counterfactual welfare gains, we can be agnostic about how much of the intermediate inputs are
sourced from within the firm. Section 3.3.1 discusses this point in more detail.
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for countries’ exposure to trade shocks and for the vertical propagation of shocks – in short,
whenever the network structure of production matters for economic outcomes.4 It also yields
a powerful new way to identify and quantify the role of enforcement institutions in shaping
development.
The paper also links to the recent theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants
of the fragmentation of production along the value chain (see, for example, Fort (2017) on
communication costs and human capital, Kee and Tang (2016) on trade costs, Acemoglu et al.
(2010) on technology, and, most recently, Atalay et al. (2017) on the role of the firm border).
My paper is most closely related to work that emphasizes the contractibility of inputs (Antra`s
and Chor, 2013, Alfaro et al., 2017) but deviates from the standard incomplete contracts setup
to allow for institutional characteristics to affect equilibrium performance on the margin. This
feature allows for a meaningful interpretation of the systematic patterns of litigation that we
observe in the data, and for a tighter integration of quantitative measures of institutional
quality in the quantification exercise. Another point of departure from the global value chains
literature is that I focus entirely on domestic value chains. This has the advantage that the role
of legal institutions is easier to identify in a domestic setting (international trade contracts are
often written to be enforced in a third-party country). Compared to the international setting, I
can also cover services trade, which not only accounts for a large fraction of economic activity,
but is also particularly prone to hold-ups due to services being intangible by nature. This
aspect also distinguishes the magnitude of results in this paper from those in the literature on
quantitative trade models with multinational production.5
The paper is also related to the recent literature on the importance of intermediate inputs
and linkages for aggregate productivity (Jones, 2011a,b, Caliendo and Parro, 2015, Caprettini
and Ciccone, 2015, Oberfield, 2017). This literature typically takes the structure of intersectoral
linkages as exogenous, or even uses the US input-output table to describe the industry structure
in other countries. In contrast, I show that input-output tables differ substantially and system-
atically across countries and exploit the systematic component of the variation in the empirical
analysis. In this sense, the most closely related papers are by Bartelme and Gorodnichenko
(2015), Caliendo et al. (2017), and Liu (2017), who also document the cross-country dispersion
in intermediate input shares and link it to aggregate productivity. The contribution of this
paper differs from those by pointing to a particular source of these frictions and showing that
they are quantitatively significant.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on legal institutions and their macroeconomic
effects (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, La Porta et al., 1997, Djankov et al., 2003, Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2005, Acemoglu et al., 2009, and many others). These papers use reduced-form
regressions to evaluate the overall importance of institutions for growth and development.
This paper contributes to this literature by providing reduced-form evidence of one particular
4See recent work by Baqaee and Farhi (2017a,b) on this topic.
5See recent contributions by, among others, Garetto (2013), Tintelnot (2016), Irarrazabal et al. (2013), Fally
and Hillberry (2015), and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2013).
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channel – the role of legal institutions in enforcing supplier contracts – and by quantifying its
importance through structural econometric modelling. Most importantly, my setup accounts
for the possibility to use informal ways of enforcing contracts, which lessen the dependence
on formal enforcement institutions. The channel I study is independent of other functions of
legal institutions, such as the protection of financial investors6, the enforcement of employment
contracts7, or the provision of incentives to invest in better technology8.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the data and studies the relationship
between intermediate input use and contracting frictions using linear regressions. These corre-
lations motivate a model where contracting frictions reduce intermediate input use. I describe
this model in Section 2. The model yields structural equations that are the nonlinear equivalent
to the reduced-form regressions of Section 1. Section 3 discusses identification and estimation
of the parameters, and conducts exercises to evaluate the importance of court quality for the
contracting environment and for aggregate outcomes. Section 4 concludes.
1 Reduced-form Empirical Evidence
1.1 Empirical Strategy
My approach to identifying the importance of legal institutions relies on the differences in the
degree to which buyers and sellers require formal enforcement of contracts. Some transactions
will be unaffected by the quality of legal institutions, such as when the presence of spot markets
or relational contracts guarantee the efficient outcome. The literature on incomplete contracts,
following Klein et al. (1978), has given various justifications for contracts being incomplete:
either the terms of the contract are not describable (in which case the incompleteness stems
from the nature of the good or service being transacted), or judges do not understand them,
or the costs of enforcement are prohibitively high. In the latter two cases the incompleteness
originates from the quality of the judicial or legal institutions. In the former case, however, the
quality of institutions will not matter for performance in the bilateral buyer-seller relationship.
I study the correlation between the input-output structure of an economy, which captures
the inter-sectoral flows of goods and services, and the quality of its legal institutions. More
specifically, I estimate the following reduced-form regression:
(1)
Xcni
Xcn
= βδc × zni + αni + αci + αcn + εcni
where Xcni is the total expenditure of sector n in country c on intermediate inputs from sector i,
both domestically and internationally sourced; Xcn is the gross output of industry n in country
6See Ponticelli and Alencar (2016) on the quantitative effects of bankruptcy reform in Brazil, and Laeven
and Woodruff (2007) and Chemin (2012) on judicial efficiency and firm size and productivity in Mexico and,
respectively, India.
7See recent work by Grobovsek (2014).
8In related theoretical work, Acemoglu et al. (2007) show that supplier contracting frictions in the sourcing
of intermediate inputs may lead firms to adopt inferior technologies.
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c; δc is a country-level measure of the cost of enforcing contracts (and hence inversely related
to the quality of legal institutions); zni is a bilateral measure of how much sectors n and i
depend on formal enforcement of contracts; αni are sector-pair fixed effects; α
c
i are upstream
sector times country fixed effects, and αcn are downstream sector times country fixed effects. The
intermediate input expenditure shares on the left-hand side of equation (1) are directly observed
in input-output tables. In the field of input-output analysis they are called the “empirical
technical input coefficients” (see, for example, Miller and Blair, 2009), and are typically seen
as exogenous parameters that describe the technical requirements of the production process.
In equation (1), country- and sector-pair-specific expenditure shares are explained by an
interaction of a country characteristic (the quality of legal institutions) with a sector-pair
characteristic (the dependence on formal enforcement) and sector-pair fixed effects. Hence, the
coefficient β captures the correlation of interaction term and left-hand side within sector pairs
and across countries. If β is negative, countries that have worse legal institutions have lower
intermediate input shares in sector-pairs that rely heavily on formal enforcement. Additional
fixed effects, along the upstream sector× country and downstream sector× country dimensions,
further condition this correlation on attributes that vary along these dimensions.
Equation (1) is similar to the functional form used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
many subsequent papers, who explain country-sector-level variables using an interaction of
a country-specific variable (often institutions or, as in the original paper, access to financial
markets) with a sector-specific variable, while controlling for country- and sector-attributes
using fixed effects. In order to interpret a significant coefficient on the interaction term as a
causal effect, this literature typically goes to great lengths to try to control for the plethora
of confounding factors that co-vary with the interaction term. Equation (1) improves on this
by exploiting variation across three different dimensions (country, upstream, and downstream
sector). Hence, I can include fixed effects at the sector × country level, thereby controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity in the upstream and downstream sectors.
Equation (1) also decomposes the variation of intermediate input shares into variation along
different dimensions. In order to find any significant conditional correlation β, there must be
cross-country variation in the left-hand side, and hence in input-output tables in general. If
input-output tables are either the same across countries, or if the differences are very small (as
a large number of papers tacitly assumes), then the sector-pair fixed effect should explain most
of the variation in the left-hand side. The conditional correlation with the interaction term will
likewise be zero if the variation in input-output tables is pure noise. We will see that neither
of that is the case.
The regression equation is also similar to the ones proposed by Nunn (2007) and Levchenko
(2007), who show that in countries with bad institutions, sectors that rely heavily on legal
institutions trade relatively less with foreign countries. International trade contracts, however,
may in principle be governed by the law of any trading partner, or even a third-party country.
The advantage of using input-output relationships to study the importance of institutions is
that one can be almost certain that the vast majority of transactions are governed by the
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local law and institutions. In addition, there is an additional dimension of variation in the
data, which will help to distinguish contracting frictions from productivity differences across
countries and sectors.
1.2 Data
Intermediate Input Expenditure Shares My data on intermediate input expenditure
shares comes from the GTAP 8 database, (Narayanan et al., 2012), the largest available cross-
sectional collection of input-output tables. GTAP contains tables from 109 countries, from
varying years ranging from the 1990’s to mid-2000 (see Appendix A), but all based on the 1993
System of National Accounts. These tables typically originate from national statistical sources
and have been harmonized by GTAP to make them internationally comparable. A notable
feature of this dataset is that it includes many developing countries, for which industry-level
data is typically scarce. The tables cover domestic and import expenditure for 56 sectors, which
I aggregate up to 35 sectors that roughly correspond to two-digit sectors in ISIC Revision 3.
My main variable of interest is Xni/Xn — the share of expenditure of sector n on intermediate
inputs from sector i, in gross output of sector n. Whenever not mentioned explicitly, these
intermediate input purchases include imported inputs. All results are robust to excluding
imported intermediate inputs (see Appendix D).
Quality of legal institutions / enforcement costs My measure of institutional quality δc
is the “cost of contract enforcement” from the World Bank Doing Business survey. This variable
measures the monetary cost necessary to enforce a standardized fictional supplier contract in
a court, and is collected through surveys of local law firms. The monetary cost is the total
cost that the plaintiff (who is assumed to be the seller) must advance to enforce the contract
in a court, and is measured as a fraction of the value of the claim. It includes court fees, fees
for expert witnesses, attorney fees, and any costs that the seller must advance to enforce the
judgment through a sale of the buyer’s assets.
The cost of enforcement from Doing Business has been widely used to proxy for the qual-
ity of contract enforcement (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2009, Nunn, 2007). While no measure of
institutional quality is without drawbacks, there are two reasons why this particular measure
lends itself well to my purposes: first, it is not based on observed litigation, and hence does
not suffer from a potential bias due to firms switching to informal contracts when enforcement
costs are too high. Second, unlike indices that aggregate over different dimensions of institu-
tional quality, it has a direct quantitative interpretation. This will be useful when studying the
quantitative importance of enforcement institutions in Section 3.
Dependence on Enforcement I construct a novel measure of dependence on formal en-
forcement from data on observed litigation between firms. My measure is the frequency with
which firms from a particular sector-pair resolve conflicts in court, or more specifically, the
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number of court cases between two sectors over a fixed period of time, per buyer-seller rela-
tionship. I collect this data for one particular country where legal institutions are good (the
United States), so that institutional quality itself is not censoring the prevalence of litigation
in an asymmetric way across sectors.
My data come from the LexisLibrary database provided by LexisNexis, which covers cases
from US federal and state courts. I take all cases between January 1990 and December 2012
that are related to contract law, ignoring appeal and higher courts, and match the plaintiff and
defendant’s names to the Orbis database of firms, provided by Bureau Van Dijk. Orbis contains
the 4-digit SIC industry classification of firms; I thus know in which sectors the plaintiffs and
defendants are active in. I count the cases by (unordered) pair of sectors, and assign the
plaintiffs and defendants to the two sectors in proportion to the expenditure flows in the US
input-output table.9 To obtain the likelihood of litigation between the two sectors, I divide the
observed number of cases by a proxy for the number of buyer-seller relationships between firms
from each pair of sectors. My first proxy for this variable is the geometric mean of the number
of firms in each sector, which reflects that the number of trading relationships will generally be
increasing in the number of firms in each sector. This yields a measure z
(1)
ni .
10 As an alternative,
I use data from Japan, where the number of buyer-seller relationships by sector-pair can be
constructed from microdata, to fit a linear model describing the number of relationships with
the number of firms in each sector and the input-output expenditure shares, and then use the
predicted value for the US to normalize the number of cases, yielding a measure z
(2)
ni .
11 These
two measures are capturing the likelihood of litigation, and hence enforcement-intensity, in
each pair of sectors. Appendix A provides detailed information on the construction procedure
of numerator and denominator in both measures, discusses the content of cases for particular
sector pairs, and compares the measures to existing measures of dependence on institutions.
z
(1)
ni =
(# cases between sectors i and n)√
(# firms in sector i) (# firms in sector n)
(2)
z
(2)
ni =
(# cases between sectors i and n)
̂(# buyer-seller relationships between i and n)
(3)
Table 1 shows the ranking of upstream sectors by the average degree of enforcement-
intensity, as measured by z
(1)
ni (the ranking for z
(2)
ni is similar). Services sectors are on average
more enforcement-intensive than manufacturing sectors, which are in turn more enforcement-
9If sales from the petroleum to the chemicals industry account for 80% of the total sales between petroleum
and chemicals, then I assume that 80% of the cases between petroleum and chemicals are related to sales of
petroleum to chemicals. Appendix D shows results using a measure where the plaintiff is the seller, which is by
far the most common case. All results also hold using these measures.
10Results are robust to (1) using the number of cases divided by the number of upstream sector firms (or
downstream sector firms) as a measure of enforcement-intensity; (2) using the number of firms from the Census
Bureau’s Statistics on U.S. Businesses instead of the number of firms in Orbis.
11The exact procedure, as well as results on the goodness of fit, are in Appendix A.3.2. I am grateful to
Andreas Moxnes for sharing the statistics on the number of Japanese buyer-seller pairs. See Bernard et al.
(2015) for more detailed information on the data source.
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intensive than raw materials-producing sectors. Once a service has been performed, it cannot
be sold to a third party, thus the scope for hold-up should be high. On the other end of the
spectrum, raw materials have low depreciability and may be readily obtained through organized
markets, thus there is relatively little scope for hold-up. A similar ranking is usually regarded to
apply to the degree of relationship-specificity of inputs (Monteverde and Teece, 1982, Masten,
1984, Nunn, 2007). Hence, my measure is consistent with the view that relationship-specific
investment leads to an increased dependence on formal enforcement.
Figure 1: Enforcement-intensity z(1)
Note: Figure shows the enforcement-intensity measure z(1) by sector pair. Selling sector is on the x-axis,
buying sector on the y-axis. Darker shades indicate higher values. Values have been monotonically transformed
to improve readability.
Figure 1 shows the within-sector variation in z(1) in more detail. There is much litigation
between firms belonging to the same sector, as the diagonal in the matrix demonstrates. Many of
these disputes arise in the licensing of intellectual property, which, due to its intangible nature,
relies heavily on enforcement by courts. But even apart from the diagonal, the firms’ propensity
to litigate seems to vary considerably across different buyer sectors: transport equipment sales,
for example, are more likely to be associated with litigation when the buyer is from the ocean
shipping industry, than when she belongs to the land transport industry (“transport n.e.c.”).
Sometimes, as in this case, the different litigation rates arise because goods and services supplied
to different sectors have different characteristics, which then lead to different likelihoods of
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Table 1—: Average enforcement-intensity of upstream sectors, z
(1)
ni measure.
Upstream sector z
(1)
ni · 104 Upstream sector z(1)ni · 104
Insurance 1.515 Paper products, publishing 0.103
Business services nec 1.307 Manufactures nec 0.097
Financial services nec 0.863 Transport equipment nec 0.095
Trade 0.483 Recreation and other services 0.090
Electricity 0.399 Mineral products nec 0.082
Chemical,rubber,plastic prods 0.371 Electronic equipment 0.082
Transport nec 0.337 Petroleum, coal products 0.080
Machinery and equipment nec 0.225 Water 0.072
Air transport 0.211 Coal 0.069
Communication 0.205 Minerals nec 0.049
Ferrous metals 0.205 Food products and beverages 0.048
Construction 0.199 Oil and Gas 0.036
Sea transport 0.194 Wearing apparel 0.031
Metal products 0.176 Wood products 0.028
Metals nec 0.147 Gas manufacture, distribution 0.027
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.130 Leather products 0.023
Motor vehicles and parts 0.130 Textiles 0.021
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat 0.121
Note: The table shows the enforcement-intensity z
(1)
ni of an upstream sector i, averaged across downstream
sectors.
disputes; in other cases it is due to particular market structures or regulation. Appendix A.3.3
documents some of these differences based on the case descriptions in LexisLibrary.
The above measures are related to existing measures of dependence on legal institutions12,
but differ in three important ways. First, the existing measures are only available for physical
goods, whereas my measures cover services sectors as well. This extension is important because
services contracts seem to rely heavily on formal enforcement — at least in the United States
— and they account for a large share of intermediate inputs and of overall economic activity.
Second, the existing measures rely heavily on each sector’s intermediate input mix, which, as I
will show further below, varies sharply across countries and is likely to depend on the country’s
quality of institutions. Third, my measure varies across bilateral sector-pairs, instead of being
associated with the upstream sector. Given that the sectors in the input-output table dataset
are fairly broad, it is likely that the products being sold to one sector are quite different to the
ones sold to other sectors, and that the form of interaction varies with the trading partner.
Using observed litigation to measure the dependence on formal enforcement has advantages
and drawbacks. One advantage is that it allows me to ignore the many different possible solu-
tions to the hold-up problem that the microeconomic literature has pointed out: if we observe
firms going to court, it must mean that the other solutions are not applicable or have failed.
The main disadvantage of using observed litigation is that firms may rely on it even if we do not
12Nunn (2007) uses the fraction of a sector’s inputs that are traded on an organized exchange to describe
relationship-specificity, arguing that legal institutions will matter only when relationship-specific investment
lead to hold-ups. Levchenko (2007) uses the Herfindahl index of input shares to measure product complexity,
with more complex products relying more heavily on institutions. Bernard et al. (2010) measure contractability
as the weighted share of wholesalers in overall importers.
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observe it: if payoffs under enforcement are deterministic and common knowledge and enforce-
ment is costly, then parties will settle in advance. Here lies the main difference between observed
litigation and relationship-specificity: only when the investment is relationship-specific, legal
institutions may matter; the reverse is not necessarily true. Hence, relationship-specificity is
necessary for institutions to matter in the contracting, whereas observing litigation is sufficient.
I will return to these considerations when interpreting the correlations.
1.3 Cross-country Dispersion in Input-Output Tables
Before turning to the regression results, I show some moments of the intermediate input shares
to dispel the myth that input-output tables are the same across countries. Table 2 shows the
dispersion of intermediate input shares at the two-digit level from their respective cross-country
means. To obtain the numbers in the first part of the table, I first calculated the standard
deviation of the intermediate input shares for each sector-pair, and then took averages of these
standard deviations. The average dispersion of expenditure shares across all sector-pairs is
2.3 percentage points. For services-producing upstream sectors, the dispersion is significantly
higher (at the 1% level) than for sectors that produce physical goods. For the average sector
pair, the cross-country dispersion in materials shares equals 2.3 times the mean. Most striking,
however, is that there is a sizeable number of sector-pairs for which the cross-country dispersion
in input expenditure shares is high: for five percent of sector pairs, the standard deviation is
greater than 10 percentage points, and for ten percent of sector pairs, the standard deviation is
more than four times as high as the mean. Hence, input-output tables are not the same across
countries.
For which inputs is the cross-country dispersion in expenditure shares particularly large?
Figure 2 shows for every upstream sector the expenditure share on this sector, averaged across
downstream sectors. I use unweighted averages, to make sure that the cross-country variation
in the resulting input shares is not due to a different sectoral composition. The left panel
shows that the dispersion is higher for inputs with higher average expenditure shares. Still,
even in log-deviations there is considerable heterogeneity across inputs. Among the inputs with
high average expenditure shares, the (wholesale and retail) trade, business services, electricity,
transport, and financial services sectors show particularly high dispersion across countries.
Note that these sectors are also particularly enforcement-intensive (Table 1 above), whereas
the percentage-wise cross-country dispersion in input shares on the (not very enforcement-
intensive) oil and gas and petroleum and coal products sectors is relatively low. This suggests
that contracting frictions may play a role for external intermediate input use. In the remainder
of this section I will try to rule out alternative explanations.
1.4 Results
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using ordinary least squares (coefficient
estimates are standardized betas). The first two columns include only sector-pair fixed effects,
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Wearing apparel
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Gas manufacture, distribution
Figure 2: Cross-country distribution of input shares by upstream sector
Note: Figure shows the cross-country distribution of average intermediate input expenditure shares, by up-
stream sector. Averages are unweighted, and are taken within each country across downstream sectors.
Table 2—: Cross-country dispersion in two-digit intermediate input shares
I. Average standard deviations and coefficient of variation of intermediate input shares
σ σ/µ
All sector pairs .023 2.3
Goods-producing upstream sectors only .020 3.5
Services-producing upstream sectors only .028 1.9
II. Frequency distribution of standard deviations and coefficient of variation
Standard deviation Coefficient of variation
Category # sector pairs % of total Category # sector pairs % of total
All 1225 100
σni < .02 838 68.4 σ/µ < 1 119 9.7
.02 < σni < .04 194 15.8 1 < σ/µ < 2 536 43.6
.04 < σni < .06 68 5.6 2 < σ/µ < 3 309 25.2
.06 < σni < .08 46 3.8 3 < σ/µ < 4 135 11.0
.08 < σni < .1 18 1.5 4 < σ/µ < 6 93 7.6
.1 < σni < .15 34 2.8 6 < σ/µ < 8 22 1.8
σni > .15 27 2.2 σ/µ > 8 11 0.9
Note: The table presents statistics regarding the cross-country dispersion of intermediate input expenditure
shares, at the two-digit sector-pair level. Part I shows means of the standard deviations, Part II shows the
frequency distribution of standard deviations and coefficients of variation. All intermediate input shares cover
both domestically and internationally sourced inputs.
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and do not correct for sectoral productivity differences across countries. Nevertheless, the
estimates of the interaction term’s coefficient, β, are negative. Columns (3) and (4) correct
for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the upstream sectors by including fixed effect
for each upstream sector-country pair. The estimates of the coefficient increase in magnitude.
In columns (5) and (6) the regression also includes downstream sector-country fixed effects to
control for differences in the size of the downstream sectors across countries. The interaction
coefficients increase slightly as a result, and remain statistically significant. Overall, Table 3
shows that in countries where enforcement costs are high, firms use less intermediate inputs in
sector-pairs where litigation is more prevalent in the United States. The estimates in columns
(5) and (6), my preferred specifications, imply that a one-standard deviation increase in each
of the interacted variables is associated with a decrease in the input share by 0.3 and 0.2
percentage points, respectively.
Table 3—: The Correlation of Intermediate Input Shares and Contracting frictions
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δc × z(1)ni -0.035∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0091) (0.0095)
δc × z(2)ni -0.028∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0071) (0.0074)
Country FE Yes Yes
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes
R2 0.449 0.449 0.531 0.531 0.537 0.537
Observations 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525
Note: Dependent variable is the expenditure of sector n in country c on domestically and internationally
sourced intermediate inputs from sector i, divided by the total gross output of sector n in country c. Table
shows standardized betas, with standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Table 4 shows results when controlling for additional variables. As a large literature points
out, contracting institutions are correlated with financial development. In order to make sure
that the observed correlation is indeed coming from contracting institutions, and not from fi-
nancial development, columns (1) and (2) control for interactions of financial development (as
measured by the ratio of private debt to GDP) with enforcement-intensity. The coefficient
of interest remains negative and significant, suggesting that prior specifications were not con-
founding the two. Interestingly, countries that are financially well-developed do seem to use
more intermediate inputs in sector pairs where litigation is frequent. There are many possible
explanations for this: credit market imperfections may lead to production being concentrated
among larger firms, which may find it easier to produce inputs that are tailored to their pro-
duction process. Alternatively, better access to financing may build trust between firms, and
may allow them to overcome hold-up problems through relational contracts. Without firm-level
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data these explanations are hard to distinguish. Columns (3) to (6) of Table 4 also control for
interactions of enforcement-intensity with per-capita income. Again the coefficient of interest
remains negative and significant.
Table 4—: Contracing Institutions vs. Financial Development vs. Overall Development
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δc × z(1)ni -0.029∗∗ -0.019∗ -0.021∗
(0.0099) (0.0094) (0.011)
δc × z(2)ni -0.026∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.020∗
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0084)
FINDEV c × z(1)ni 0.050∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
FINDEV c × z(2)ni 0.040∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0094)
logGDPCc × z(1)ni 0.22∗∗ 0.093
(0.068) (0.076)
logGDPCc × z(2)ni 0.18∗∗∗ 0.074
(0.049) (0.054)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Observations 132300 132300 133525 133525 132300 132300
Note: Table shows standardized betas, with standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 5 turns to regressions on subsamples. Columns (1) and (2) include only pairs of
sectors that produce physical goods (i.e. agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; the top
left square of the input-output table), and columns (3) and (4) include only pairs of services
sectors (the bottom right square). Notice two things: firstly, the coefficients are larger than
in the benchmark. Perhaps firms are more willing to produce an input in-house if they are
in a related business. Secondly, the coefficient in the services-only subsample is substantially
larger than in manufacturing. A plausible explanation would be that firms face more discretion
over their choice of services tasks in the production process. Managers in developing countries
may not see accounting or R&D as vital to their production, and neglect those activities when
expecting difficulties in sourcing them.
Let’s take a closer look at how δc and zni interact. Table 6 shows the results of a regression of
intermediate input shares on interactions of the enforcement-intensity measures with dummies
for whether enforcement costs are in each of the five quintiles of the cross-country distribution
of enforcement costs (the first quintile being the base category):
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Table 5—: Within Manufacturing & Within Services
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δc × z(1)ni -0.047∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.023)
δc × z(2)ni -0.040∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.020)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample M only M only S only S only
R2 0.64 0.64 0.47 0.47
Observations 48069 48069 21364 21364
Note: Table shows standardized betas, with standard errors clustered at the country level. For columns (1)
and (2), the sample consists of all sector pairs where both sectors are producing physical goods (agriculture,
mining, and manufacturing); for columns (3) and (4) the sample consists of all sector pairs where both sectors
are services sectors.
Xcni
Xcn
=
5∑
j=2
βj1 (δ
c ∈ Quintile j)× zni + αni + αci + αcn + εcni
and likewise with interactions of quintile dummies for enforcement-intensity z with δ. We see
that the correlation with the interaction term is only significant when enforcement costs (re-
spectively, z) are in the highest quintile. This is in line with the view that when enforcement
costs are sufficiently low, parties use formal contracts that are enforceable in courts. In such
cases, product-specific attributes that determine the scope for hold-ups do not affect perfor-
mance in the bilateral relationship: once you can cheaply enforce your contract in the court,
how relationship-specific your good is does not matter anymore. When you get held up, you
either threaten to enforce the contract, or to sell the goods to a third party — but not both. I
will return to these considerations when writing the model in Sections 2 and 3.
1.5 Discussion
It is important to stress that the significant coefficient of the interaction term cannot be in-
terpreted as evidence for a “causal effect”. Naturally, the quality of legal institutions is going
to determine to some extent whether firms litigate; hence, even if we had data on litigation in
every country, it would not make sense to use it in place of zni. In other words, the true model
for Xni/Xn will not be a linear one with δ
c times a frequency of litigation on the right hand
side. Instead, the tables above show statistically significant correlations, from which we can
draw some conclusions, and which will guide the model. But it does not make sense to speak
of “endogeneity” in this context: the estimated coefficient does not have an interpretation as a
parameter of an economic model. In Sections 2 and 3 I will, however, construct a model where
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Table 6—: Conditional correlations for different degrees of enforcement costs
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
Using z
(1)
ni Using z
(2)
ni Using z
(1)
ni Using z
(2)
ni
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 (δc ∈ 2nd Quintile )× zni 0.0076 0.0017
(0.010) (0.0081)
1 (δc ∈ 3rd Quintile )× zni -0.0070 -0.010
(0.0087) (0.0071)
1 (δc ∈ 4th Quintile )× zni -0.0074 -0.011
(0.011) (0.0083)
1 (δc ∈ 5th Quintile )× zni -0.024∗ -0.024∗∗
(0.010) (0.0082)
1 (zni ∈ 3rd Quintile )× δc -0.0042 -0.0018
(0.0032) (0.0037)
1 (zni ∈ 4th Quintile )× δc -0.0058 -0.0033
(0.0061) (0.0059)
1 (zni ∈ 5th Quintile )× δc -0.029∗∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.011) (0.0096)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.537
Observations 133525 133525 133525 133525
Note: Table shows standardized betas, with standard errors clustered at the country level. In columns (3) and
(4), the base category for the interactions are the observations where z is zero, which account for the first two
quintiles of the z distribution. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
input-output relationships and litigation are jointly determined by productivity parameters, in-
stitutions, and product-specific attributes. This model will yield an estimating equation similar
to the above, where a corresponding parameter estimate (namely, a trade elasticity) captures
the response of intermediate input cost shares to changes in contracting frictions.
So what do these correlations tell us? First of all, they are consistent with the view that
good formal enforcement helps with overcoming holdup problems when sourcing intermediate
inputs, in line with the empirical results of Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) at the industry
level, and the results of Johnson et al. (2002) at the firm level. Secondly, while there may be
alternative ways to get around holdup problems (relational contracts, hostages, option con-
tracts — ways that do not depend on the characteristics of the product being traded), these
do not seem to be a perfect substitute for formal enforcement in courts: if they were, the
correlation would disappear. Thirdly, for some sector-pairs formal and informal enforcement
are indeed substitutes: when a product is not relationship-specific, firms will use informal con-
tracts and never litigate; for these sector-pairs the quality of legal institutions is not correlated
with intermediate input use. Likewise, when formal enforcement costs are low, the degree of
relationship-specificity does not matter (Table 6).
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Stronger contracting frictions are associated with lower intermediate input use. But is that
because the firm vertically integrates, or because it decides to use a production technology that
omits certain inputs? Both interpretations are consistent with the above results. Input-Output
tables are typically constructed at the plant level, and are therefore not fully conclusive about
the extent of vertical integration.13 That said, there are several arguments that suggest that
a lot of the variation in intermediate input use is coming from different degrees of vertical
integration. Firstly, Atalay et al. (2014) and Ramondo et al. (2016) show that shipments of
physical goods between vertically integrated plants are very low; in the case of the former paper,
less than 0.1 percent of overall sales for the median plant. Hence, most of the intermediate
input use that one observes in Input-Output tables are going to be transactions across firm
boundaries. Secondly, even though the SNA 1993, which underlies the construction of the
Input-Output tables, mandates the recording of all types of intermediate inputs that come
from outside the unit of observation (the plant), it is a fact of the data collection process that
services inputs that come from within the firm are typically not priced, and therefore have
no expenditure associated with it. Hence, services inputs would typically only show up in
input-output tables if they are coming from outside the firm. Variation in the services input
shares will therefore be variation in the use of services sourced from other firms (cf. columns
(3) and (4) of Table 5). Thirdly, Ferguson and Formai (2013) extend the work of Nunn (2007)
to show that contracting institutions shape comparative advantage less for industries that
have the ability to vertically integrate, suggesting that integration alleviates (at least to some
extent) the hold-up problem. Perhaps the most conclusive evidence can be found by studying
the precise mix of intermediate inputs at the plant level: Boehm and Oberfield (2018) study
detailed microdata on the input mix of Indian manufacturing plants and show that when judicial
institutions are poor, plants respond by performing a larger range of production steps within
the plant (integration) or switch to a different set of inputs that omits certain relationship-
specific components (technology choice): a car producer might decide to make low-tech cars
that do not rely on customized electronic components.
Finally, I mention some additional results and robustness checks. The correlations between
contracting frictions and the intermediate input shares are certainly not smaller (if anything,
they are larger) for homogeneous-good-producing sectors, suggesting that firms producing lower
quality products when contracting frictions are large is not the main driver of the correlation
reported above. Furthermore, the negative correlation remains statistically significant (a) when
having the input-output share with domestically source intermediate inputs only on the left
hand side; (b) when excluding the top three most litigious sectors — insurance, business ser-
vices, and financial services; (c) when controlling for interactions of δc with the US input-output
shares; (d) when replacing zni by a measure of relationship-specificity using Rauch’s classifica-
tion of goods, in the spirit of Nunn (2007); (e) when controlling for interactions of a variable
13There is, however, a large related literature in industrial organization that measures the degree of vertical
integration as the fraction of value added in gross output (see Adelman, 1955, Levy, 1985, Holmes, 1999, and
also Macchiavello, 2012).
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that is constructed similarly to z(i) but uses the US input output table instead of the pairwise
litigation count; (f) results with the US input output table as a “placebo”; (g) PPML instead
of OLS estimates of (1). Furthermore, they are not driven by problems in the measurement of
intermediate inputs in developing countries. The interested reader can find all this in Appendix
D.
2 A Quantitative Model of Input Sourcing
This section presents a simple macroeconomic model where firms face the decision between
producing in-house and outsourcing. The purpose of the model is twofold: to explain how
differences in input-output shares emerge from differences in productivity patterns and from
frictions, and to present a framework for empirical work, in which productivity differences and
contracting frictions can be identified and their importance for aggregate outcomes evaluated.
The model explains the correlations from the preceding section, and allows me to link them to
welfare. It also tackles the issue that litigation is an outcome of institutional quality itself.
The model economy is closed.14 Outsourcing is subject to frictions due to the presence of
contract enforcement costs. These frictions distort the relative price of outsourcing, and thus
lead to over-use of in-house production. I first discuss the firm’s production functions, and the
modes of sourcing. I then put the model into general equilibrium by adding households, and
derive predictions for aggregate input use.
Methodologically, the model exploits the tractability of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) ap-
proach to modeling discrete sourcing decisions, albeit for a very different purpose. I model the
firm’s binary decision to outsource in the same way as Eaton and Kortum model the decision
which country to buy from. Intersectoral intermediate input flows hence follow a “gravity”
equation. Contracting frictions enter the expression for intermediate input shares in the same
way that iceberg trade costs enter the expression for trade shares in Ricardian trade models.
2.1 Technology
There are N sectors in the economy, each consisting of a mass of perfectly competitive and
homogeneous firms. Sector n firms convert inputs {(qni(j), j ∈ [0, 1]}i=1,...,N into output yn
according to the production function.15
(4) yn =
N∏
i=1
(∫ 1
0
qni(j)
(σn−1)/σndj
) σn
σn−1γni
, n = 1, . . . , N.
14It would be straightforward to extend the model to include international sourcing, but difficult to empirically
operationalize it: trading partners would have to choose a jurisdiction to govern contracts, and this jurisdiction
may even be a third country. In the data we do not observe which jurisdiction governs contracts. However, as I
will show, most of the gains from improving formal enforcement institutions arise from the lower cost of using
services inputs, which are typically not traded across country borders.
15Appendix E generalizes the production function to a CES function in input bundles i.
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where
∑
i γni = 1 for all n = 1, . . . , N . The sets {(n, i, j), j ∈ [0, 1]}i=1,...,N are the sets of inputs
that sector n may source from a firm belonging to sector i, or, alternatively, produce itself using
labor.16 The index j denotes the individual activities/varieties within each basket. As an exam-
ple, consider a car manufacturing plant. Then, n = car and i ∈ {metal, electricity, R&D, . . . }
are the different broad sets of activities, corresponding to the different upstream (roughly
2-digit) sectors, that need to be performed during the production process. The index j cor-
responds to the individual varieties of inputs (in the case of physical inputs) or tasks (in the
case of intangible inputs) in each basket (n, i). The firm faces the outsourcing decision for
every (n, i, j): a manufacturing plant may want to contract with an accounting firm to do the
accounting for them, or decide to employ an accountant themselves, perhaps at a higher cost.
In this case, the activity j would be ’accounting’, and the upstream industry i would be the
business services sector. The technological parameters γni captures the weight of the broad set
of inputs i in the production process of sector n: γcars,steel will be high, whereas γcars,agriculture
will be low.
For each activity (n, i, j), the sector n firms have to decide whether to produce the activity
themselves, or to outsource it. I model the boundaries of firms to be determined by the existence
of inter-firm transaction costs, as in the transaction-cost economics literature on the vertical
integration problem (see Williamson, 1985) and by the existence of firm-specific capabilities,
as emphasized by Wernerfelt (1984). Both the downstream firm and the potential suppliers
draw an activity-specific productivity realization, which determine the cost of each option. The
downstream firm decides on whether to outsource by comparing them. Outsourcing, however,
is subject to contracting frictions, which increase its cost and thus lead to too much in-house
production compared to a frictionless world. Once the decision of whether to outsource has
been taken, it is irreversible. I discuss each of the two options in turn.
In-house Production. The sector n firm can produce activity (n, i, j) itself by employing
labor. One unit of labor generates sni(j) units of activity (n, i, j), thus the production function
is qni(j) = sni(j)l(n, i, j), where l(n, i, j) is labor used and sni(j) is a stochastic productivity
realization that follows a Fre´chet distribution,
P (sni(j) < z) = e
−Snz−θ .
The productivity draws sni(j) are independent across i, j, and n. The parameter Sn captures
the overall productivity of in-house production by sector n firms: higher Sn will, on average,
lead to higher realizations of the productivity parameters sni(j). The parameter θ is inversely
related to the variance of the distribution.
The labor market is perfectly competitive. Denote the wage by w, and the cost of one unit
16This is a model where every sector buys from every other sector, but apart from parameters, they are all
ex-ante identical. In a bilateral trade between two sectors, I always denote the downstream (buying) sector by
n and the upstream (selling) sector by i.
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of activity (n, i, j) under on in-house production by plni(j). Then,
plni(j) =
w
sni(j)
.
Outsourcing. Alternatively to in-house production, sector n firms can outsource production
of activity (n, i, j) to the the upstream sector i. For each activity (n, i, j), there is one sector i
firm that can produce it, and firms are monopolistically competitive in the market for activities.
Each sector i firms can transform one unit of sector i output (produced using the production
function (4)) into tni(j) units of its activity (n, i, j), thus the production function is qni(j) =
tni(j)yi(n, i, j), with yi(n, i, j) being the amount of sector i goods used as inputs.
17 Again I
assume that the tni(j) follow a Fre´chet distribution,
P (tni(j) < z) = e
−Tiz−θ
and that they are independent across i, j, and n. The average productivity realization is
increasing in the parameter Ti, which captures the upstream sector’s overall capabilities (pro-
ductivity, endowments, etc.). The supplier’s cost of producing one unit of variety (n, i, j) is
then cni(j) = pi/tni(j), where pi is the price index of sector i’s output good, (4).
Institutions. Assume further that outsourcing is subject to contracting frictions that take
the form of a multiplicative wedge dni ≥ 1 on the cost of the activity (but that it is not a resource
cost). One should think of dni as being determined by the efficiency loss associated with a hold-
up problem: when the traded good is relationship-specific, the buyer has an incentive to hold
up the seller by withholding payment. The degree of relationship-specificity and the quality
of enforcement institutions then determine the seller’s payoff. This ex-post payoff affects the
supplier’s ex-ante incentives to perform, and therefore the surplus from the relationship. Hence,
dni is shaped both by institutions and by product-specific attributes: when enforcement of the
contract ensures that the supplier receives her full return on the investment, the equilibrium is
efficient and dni = 1. When institutions are such that enforcement is not possible, the outcome
will be below the first-best, with the degree of efficiency loss (and dni) being determined by the
scrap value of the produced goods, and hence the degree of relationship-specificity. Appendix B
formalizes this intuition and provides a microfoundation for dni. For the purpose of explaining
the macro-structure of the model, it is sufficient to treat it as a black box. In Section 3 I will
place a structure consistent with the microfoundation on dni, and use it to evaluate the role of
institutions in shaping frictions and aggregate outcomes.
Taking the contracting friction into account, the overall cost of sourcing one unit of activity
17The assumption that variety (n, i, j) is produced using sector i goods in the case of outsourcing means that
the model exhibits input-output linkages across sectors. Ultimately, the whole production process is done using
labor and a constant returns to scale production technology; the distinction between labor and intermediate
inputs simply draws the sector boundaries and allows for better comparison with the data.
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(n, i, j) is
pxni(j) =
µnpidni
zni(j)
where µn = σn/ (σn − 1) is the markup due to monopolistic competition. Going back in time,
the downstream sector firms decide on whether to produce in-house or to outsource by com-
paring the cost of the activity under the two regimes, plni(j) and p
x
ni(j). Given the perfect
substitutability between the two options, the realized cost of activity (n, i, j) is
(5) pni(j) = min
(
plni(j), p
x
ni(j)
)
.
2.2 Households’ Preferences and Endowments
There is a representative household with Cobb-Douglas preferences over the consumption of
goods from each sector,
(6) U =
N∏
i=1
cηii ,
with
∑N
i=1 ηi = 1. The output of each sector, yi, is hence being used both for final consumption
by households, and as intermediate input in the production of outsourced activities. House-
holds have a fixed labor endowment L and receive labor income wL and the profits of the
monopolistically competitive suppliers, Π. Their budget constraint is
∑N
i=1 pici ≤ wL+ Π, and
thus pici = ηi (wL+ Π).
2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Allocations
To describe sectoral price levels and expenditure shares, some definitions are helpful. Let
Xni ≡
∫ 1
0
pni(j)qni(j)1{j:pxni(j)<plni(j)}dj be the expenditure of sector n firms on activities that are
sourced from sector i, and Xn =
∑
i
∫ 1
0
pni(j)qni(j)dj the total expenditure (and gross output)
of sector n. We then have
Proposition 1 (Sectoral price levels and expenditure shares) Under cost minimization
by the downstream sector firms, the following statements hold:
1. The cost of producing one unit of output yn in sector n satisfies
(7) pn =
N∏
i=1
(
αn
γni
(
Snw
−θ + Ti(µnpidni)−θ
)− 1
θ
)γni
where w is the wage, and αn ≡
(
Γ
(
1−σn
θ
+ 1
)) 1
1−σn , with Γ(·) being the gamma function.
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2. The input expenditure shares Xni/Xn satisfy
(8)
Xni
Xn
= γni
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Furthermore, Xni/Xn is decreasing in dni.
Proposition 1 gives expressions for the sectoral price levels and intermediate input expen-
diture shares. The sectoral price levels solve the system of equations (7), and depend on the
cost of production under outsourcing and under in-house production, and therefore on the
productivity parameters Ti and Sn, as well as on the contracting frictions dni. Suppliers may
themselves outsource part of their production process, which gives rise to input-output link-
ages between sectors; the sectoral price levels are thus a weighted harmonic mean of the price
levels of the other sectors. This mechanism strengthens the impact of the price distortions: an
increase in the price of coal increases the prices of steel and, through steel, machines, which
in turn increases the cost of producing steel further due to the steel industry’s dependence on
machines.
The expenditure shares on intermediate inputs, equation (8), are then determined by the
relative effective cost of outsourcing versus in-house production. Higher effective cost of out-
sourcing will lead downstream firms to produce more activities in-house instead of outsourcing
them. Thus, the expenditure share of sector n on inputs from sector i is increasing in sector
i’s productivity, Ti, and the importance of sector i products for sector n, γni, and decreasing in
sector i’s input cost pi and contracting frictions dni.
Proposition 1 yields the key qualitative prediction of the model, namely that contracting
frictions, captured by dni ≥ 1, negatively affect the downstream sector’s fraction of expenditure
on intermediate inputs from the upstream sector i. The elasticity θ determines the magnitude
of this effect.
Firms make profits in inter-sectoral relationships due to them having monopoly power for
their variety. Aggregate profits are Π =
∑
n,i Πni =
∑
n,i 1/(σ − 1)Xni and the markets for
sectoral output clear:
(9) pici +
∑
n
(Xni − Πni) = Xi, i = 1, . . . , N.
An equilibrium is a vector of sectoral price functions (pn(w))n=1,...,N that satisfies (7). Given
sectoral prices, all other endogenous variables can be directly calculated from the preceding
equations. We obtain:
Proposition 2 Under constant returns to scale,
∑
i γni = 1 for all n, an equilibrium exists
and is unique.
The proof is straightforward: since ∂ log pn/∂ log pi = Xni/Xn, and ∃x < 1 such that
∑
iXni/Xn <
x for all n, the function defined by the right-hand side of (7) is a contraction mapping and has
a unique fixed point.
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2.4 The welfare gains from eliminating enforcement frictions
Let’s now take a closer look at the welfare gains from reducing enforcement frictions. My
measure of welfare is real income per capita. Since households receive both labor income and
the profits of intermediaries, and the wage is the numeraire, welfare is
(10)
Y
PL
=
1 + Π/L
P
.
Welfare gains therefore arise from a decrease in consumer prices P , and from an increase in
profits per capita Π/L, as more tasks become outsourced. Taking the total differential of the
sectoral price levels pn in equation (7), and holding constant the T and S parameters, we obtain
(11) d log pn =
∑
i
Xni
Xn
(d log pi + d log dni) .
Enforcement costs affect the sector’s price index both directly through the multiplicative dis-
tortion dni, and indirectly through the price level of its upstream sectors. The strength of
the input-output linkages is given by the expenditure shares Xni/Xn. Write (11) in matrix
notation,
(12) d log p = (I − Ξ)−1 diag
(
Ξ (d log dni)
′
n,i
)
where Ξ = (Xni/Xn)n,i denotes the matrix of expenditure shares. We see that the impact
of distortions on sectoral price levels is determined by the Leontief inverse (I − Ξ)−1, as in
standard sectoral models with input-output linkages. What is new, however, is that the ex-
penditure shares, and hence the Leontief inverse, are endogenously determined by the cost of
in-house production versus outsourcing. Hence, equations (11) and (12) are only first-order
approximations which hold exactly only for small changes in log dni. Note, in particular, that
the first-order effects do not depend on the elasticity θ; it matters only for the change in the
multiplier (i.e. the second-order effects).
3 Evaluating the Importance of Enforcement Costs
If, as shown in Section 1, some of the variation in Input-Output tables is explained by contract-
ing frictions, then how much do these distortions matter for welfare? In this section, I apply
the model to address this question. The strategy is to identify and estimate the parameters in
the gravity-like expression for the input-output share, equation (8).
I start by taking the closed-economy model to a cross-country setting. Assume each country
is described by the closed-economy model of Section 2, with country-specific cost parameter
vectors T and S. The γni capture the country-invariant technical aspects of the production
process. Furthermore, the demand elasticities σ and the trade elasticity θ are assumed to
be constant across countries. Denoting country-specific parameters by a superscript c, the
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expression for the input-output shares becomes
Xcni
Xcn
= γni
T ci (µnp
c
id
c
ni)
−θ
Scn + T
c
i (µnp
c
id
c
ni)
−θ .
3.1 Putting Structure on the Contracting Frictions
In the setup of the model in Section 2, contracting frictions are described by a multiplicative
wedge dcni on the cost of sourcing. Guided by the extensive literature on the hold-up problem
and by the empirical findings in Section 1, I will now put enough structure on this wedge to be
able to identify and quantitatively evaluate the importance of formal enforcement institutions.
Readers who are interested in a more explicit microfoundation for these ad-hoc assumptions
are referred to Appendix B, which describes a bilateral contracting game that yields a special
case of the expressions below.
The literature on the hold-up problem, following Klein et al. (1978), emphasizes efficiency
losses in buyer-seller relationships when assets are specific to the relationship. In empirical
applications, the degree of specificity is typically seen as a characteristic of the product or the
market (Nunn, 2007, Levchenko, 2007). Denote by dI the distortion under an informal contract,
i.e. the efficiency loss in a situation where enforcement of a contract in a court was not possible
at all. If parties always have access to such a contracting environment (e.g. through the use of
a “gentlemen’s agreement”), then the availability of formal enforcement can only act to reduce
the overall amount of efficiency loss:
dcni = min
(
(dF )cni, (d
I)cni
)
where (dF )cni denotes the efficiency loss in a “formal” contracting environment, where parties
have access to formal legal recourse. Assume now that the distortion in a formal contracting
environment depends on the quality of the legal institutions, and that the distortions under
an informal contract only depend on sector-pair-specific (and therefore country-invariant) at-
tributes such as the degree of relationship-specificity of the produced goods18,
(dF )cni = d
F (δc), (dI)cni = (d
I)ni
then the expression above becomes
(13) dcni = min
(
dF (δc), dIni
)
.
Equation (13) captures the intuition that whenever the formal legal institutions are good enough
to make them preferable over an informal contract, then agents will write a contract in such a
way that in a hold-up situation, the outside option is to enforce the contract in a court. In such
18This assumption corresponds to the assumption in Nunn (2007) that relationship-specificity is a sector
characteristic only.
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a case, the equilibrium performance of agents will depend on the quality of the legal system,
including the cost of enforcement, and the degree of relationship-specificity of assets will not
matter. If, however, formal enforcement is expensive, unpredictable, or generally unavailable,
or if asset specificity is sufficiently low (more precisely, whenever dF > dI), then agents will
use an informal arrangement for exchange, and then—on the margin—the quality of formal
enforcement institutions will not matter. The equilibrium performance, and hence the wedge,
will then depend entirely on the degree of relationship-specificity of the produced goods.
From the above considerations, it should be clear that litigation will only be observed
when parties use a formal contract, i.e. when dF < dI . Hence, for a given country c, the
prevalence of litigation tells us something about how likely it is that the distortions from
informal arrangements exceed the distortions from formal contracts: sector-pairs with frequent
litigation will on average have high dIni; the scope for hold-up is high. Hence, one can write
dIni = d
I(zni)
where zni is the empirical prevalence of litigation between firms from sectors n and i in one
country, as captured by the measure of dependence on enforcement in Section 1, and dI is an
increasing function. To be conservative, I assume dI(0) = 1, which means that enforcement
frictions are not present when we do not observe litigation. Violations of this assumption (for
example when in a particular sector pair, firms benefit from the possibility of going to court,
but would always settle outside of court) would mean that the importance of institutions would
be larger than what I estimate them to be. Finally, I normalize dF (0) = 1 (if enforcement is
completely costless, there is no distortion either).19
The above functional form, equation (13), is consistent with the correlations in Section 1:
Table 6 showed that litigiosity zni is only correlated with intermediate input shares for the
countries where enforcement costs are sufficiently high, supporting the view that the overall
distortion is a minimum of the distortion under formal contracting (which is a increasing in
the country-wide enforcement costs) and the distortion under informal contracting (which is
decreasing in the degree of litigation in each pair of sectors).
19This assumption may seem counterfactual: even when enforcement is costless, limits to e.g. verifiability
may mean that contracting frictions are present. It does not, however, impose a strong loss of generality on the
estimation: in the estimation approach below where dF is estimated nonparametrically (the “first strategy”),
the estimated function values for the countries with the best courts (around δc = 10%) would capture the
distortion in these countries. Mathematically, the dF curve is restricted to go through the point (0, 1), but only
the function values for δc ∈ [0.1;∞) matter for the estimation and welfare counterfactual.
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3.2 Identification and Estimation
My estimating equation is the model’s expression for intermediate input expenditure shares,
with an additive error term with zero conditional mean,
(14)
Xcni
Xcn
= γni
T ci (µnp
c
id
c
ni)
−θ
Scn + T
c
i (µnp
c
id
c
ni)
−θ + ε
c
ni
where the parameter restrictions for constant returns to scale,
∑
i γni = 1 for all n, are imposed.
One can re-write this equation in the form
(15)
Xcni
Xcn
= γni
1
1 + exp(αcn − αci + θ log dcni)
+ εcni
where, in a slight abuse of notation, αcn = log(S
c
n/µ
−θ
n ) and α
c
i = log
(
T ci (p
c
i)
−θ). Since markups
µn are not identified separately, I calibrate σn = σ = 3.5, which implies markups of 40 percent.
This renders the above mapping invertible; the T ci and S
c
n parameters are therefore exactly
identified. Formally, the linear estimating equation in Section 1 is a linear approximation of
equation (15) around an I-O structure where expenditure shares are proportional to technical
coefficients γni:
Proposition 3 (Relationship between estimating equations in Sections 1 and 3) Let
c¯ be a country with parameters such that X c¯ni/X
c¯
n ∝ γni for all n, i and εc¯ni = 0, and let
φ ≡ (X c¯ni/X c¯n)/γni. Then, up to a first-order approximation in T ci , Scn, and dcni,
Xcni
Xcn
≈ X
c¯
ni
X c¯n
+ (1− φ) ((lnT ci − lnT c¯i )− (lnScn − lnS c¯n)− θ(ln pci − ln pc¯i)− θ(ln dcni − ln dc¯ni)) .
The upstream sector × country fixed effect in equation (1) hence captures the deviation of
the upstream sectors’ productivity Ti and cost index pi from the uniform benchmark; the
downstream sector × country fixed effect captures the deviation of the downstream sectors’
productivity from the benchmark. The interaction of δc and zni corresponds to the contracting
frictions term ln dcni − ln dc¯ni.
To structurally identify contracting frictions, I follow two different strategies. In the first, I
follow the motivation from above and set
(16) dcni = min
(
dF (δc), dI(zni)
)
and estimate dI and dF semiparametrically as quadratic polynomials with intercept equal to
one. Since the curvature of these polynomials is hard to distringuish from θ, I calibrate θ
directly by setting it to the consensus estimate for the trade elasticity, θ = 4 (see Head and
Mayer, 2013, Simonovska and Waugh, 2014): like the trade elasticity in models that follow
Eaton and Kortum (2002), such as Caliendo and Parro (2015), the elasticity θ emerges from
the tail parameter of the Fre´chet productivity draw distributions.
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In the second strategy I set dcni equal to the distortion as it would arise when microfounding
it using the contracting game of Appendix B,
dcni = min
(
1
1− 1
2
δc
, dI(zni)
)
,
and again estimate dI as a quadratic polynomial. This approach makes use of the fact that
my measure for institutional quality (the cost of enforcement, as a fraction of the value of
the claim) has a direct quantitative interpretation as a model parameter. If plaintiffs are not
compensated for costs incurred during enforcement (such as, for instance, in the United States),
suppliers may underperform because they know that they will be held up and that subsequent
enforcement is costly, with the cost being increasing in their performance level. The parameter
1
2
is the assumed bargaining power of the supplier in the out-of-court settlement. This choice
of parameters implies, for example, that the distortion under formal contracting is 3.7 times
higher in India, a country with notoriously slow and ineffective courts, than in the United
States. In the countries with the best courts (δc ≈ 0.1), the assumption implies that frictions
are bounded above by around 5%. This second approach places stronger assumptions on the
distortion under formal contracting, but allows me to estimate the elasticity θ myself. As we
will see, both approaches lead to similar results.
Compare the nonlinear estimating equation (15) to the linear expressions in the regressions
in Section 1, equation (1). In both expressions the input-output share is a function of enforce-
ment costs. Here, however, the sector × country fixed effects have a structural interpretation as
parameters governing the cost of sourcing or producing inputs. The multiplicative interaction
of δ and z has been replaced by the minimum: when enforcement costs are prohibitively high,
firms use arrangements that do not rely on the quality of courts — and then, on the margin, en-
forcement costs do not matter. Finally, the elasticity θ governs how strongly frictions decrease
intermediate input shares. In contrast to the coefficient on the interaction term in the linear
regressions, which described the strength of a conditional correlation, θ governs the magnitude
of a causal effect.
Let’s turn to the estimation. The problem of choosing a suitable estimator for the pa-
rameters in equation (15) shares many similarities with the choice of an estimator for gravity
equations in international trade (see Head and Mayer, 2013, for a summary). The nonlinear
least squares estimator would place much weight on large observations and suffers from numer-
ical problems due to nonconvexities. These difficulties would be resolved when estimating the
equation in logs. However, a NLS estimator on the log of (15) would place much weight on the
many intermediate input share observations that are close to zero in levels, and deeply nega-
tive in the log. Instead, I use a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator, which
emerges as a compromise between placing weight on large and small observations, while still
being numerically feasible. The PPML has been widely used to estimate gravity-type equations
since being recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Mathematically, the estimator
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is defined as
(17) βˆ = arg maxβ
∑
n,i,c
(
Xcni
Xcn
log g (β)− g (β)
)
where β is the vector of estimands, g (β) = γni/(1+exp(α
c
n−αci +θ log dcni)), and the maximiza-
tion is subject to the constraints
∑
i γni = 1 for every n = 1, . . . , N . The PPML is consistent
if the conditional mean of the intermediate input shares is as described by the model equation.
Numerically, the estimator turns out to be friendly for the above functional form: for given
country- and sector-invariant parameters, the maximization converges to a unique solution,
hence it is easy to find a global maximum by searching over the space of the country- and
sector-invariant parameters.
Table 7—: Structural estimation results
Calibrated θ, Estimated θ,
Estimated dF Calibrated dF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
θ 4 4 4.31 4.77
(0.07) (0.01)
z measure used z(1) z(2) z(1) z(2)
Pseudo-loglikelihood -8550.91 -8551.35 -8553.52 -8549.03
Pseudo-R2 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65
Note: Table shows calibrated (columns (1) and (2)) and estimated (columns (3) and (4)) values for θ, and
statistics on the model fit. The pseudo-R2 is defined as the squared correlation coefficient between fitted
input-output shares and the data. Table 21 in the Appendix shows the estimates of dI and dF .
Table 7 shows the results from estimating the model under the two approaches. The R2
(defined as the square of the correlation coefficient between observed and fitted intermediate
input shares) is around 0.65, substantially larger than in the linear regressions of Section 1,
where it is around 0.54. In the strategy where θ is estimated, the estimates are 4.31 and 4.77
when using z(1) and z(2), close to the calibrated value in the other approach, and close to
structural estimates of the trade elasticity (perhaps unsurprisingly, since θ refers both here and
in Eaton and Kortum (2002) to the Fre´chet tail index of the productivity draw distribution).
3.3 Welfare Analysis
With the model estimated, I am now able to evaluate the importance of enforcement frictions.
I take the estimated values for the model parameters and simulate welfare (real per-capita
income).20 Subsequently, I set each country’s enforcement costs to the level of the United
States (14%), a level that is low in international comparison but still possible to achieve for
most countries through judicial reform, and see how much welfare changes.
20In order to evaluate welfare, I need to calibrate the households’ consumption shares ηci . I set them to the
values reported in GTAP.
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Figure 3: Counterfactual welfare gains from setting enforcement costs to US levels
Note: Enforcement costs are top-coded at one to help exposition.
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Figure 3 visualizes the results of these exercises in a scatter plot.21 Each dot corresponds
to a country; the location on the x-axis is the contract enforcement cost prior to the change,
δc; the location on the y-axis is the counterfactual increase in real per-capita income Y/P , in
percent. The main message of the figure is that in all specifications, the effects of reducing
enforcement costs to US levels can be large, ranging up to ten percentage points of real income
for some countries. But even under the most conservative specifications, shown in the bottom-
right panel, half of all countries would experience an increase of more than three percent, and a
third would experience an increase of more than 4.5 percent in real income. Hence, the welfare
loss from poor enforcement institutions is relevant on the macroeconomic scale.
Figure 3 also shows the concave relationship between enforcement costs and the gains from
reducing them. When enforcement costs are high (such as for the four countries where they
exceed 100 percent), firms use informal contracts, and then a marginal change in enforcement
costs would not matter. Only when they are sufficiently low and firms use formal contracting
relationships, a reduction in enforcement costs will start having an effect on performance in
bilateral relationships.
3.3.1 Sources of the welfare gains
To understand the sources of the welfare gains above, it is helpful to draw parallels to the
literature on the gains from international trade. Like in Arkolakis et al. (2012), changes in
real income are a function of changes in trade shares (here, intermediate input shares) and the
elasticity θ.22 For a given variation of intermediate input shares that is explained by contracting
frictions, a lower θ would imply that the underlying price distortions are larger, and lead to
larger gains from eliminating frictions. In the case where θ is fixed, the welfare gains are
determined by the fraction of the variation in intermediate input shares that is explained by
enforcement costs.
This analogy provides an intuition for what does (and what does not) matter for our es-
timated welfare gains from reducing enforcement costs. If the functional form for contracting
frictions dcni was misspecified, then enforcement cost could explain a larger – or smaller – fraction
of input cost shares.23 In particular, if some of the transactions that show up in input-output
tables are within-firm transactions where either hold-up problems do not arise or court enforce-
ment is not an option, then the correlation between enforcement costs and input shares that we
observe is weaker than what it would otherwise be. Since our welfare counterfactual uses only
the explained variation in input cost shares, we can be agnostic about whether intermediate
21Appendix D shows the results separately for each country, and performs a robustness check where broad
input baskets are more substitutable than implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function.
22The “sufficient statistic” approach cannot be used here because the expenditure on in-house production is
not observed separately for each triple (n, i, c)— only as value added for each sector-country pair.
23Note that the min functional form for dcni is supported both by theoretical considerations (substitutability
of formal and informal enforcement; see Appendix B) and by empirical evidence (Table 6). Approximating
dcni itself by a polynomial in δ
c and zni (and other robustness checks on the functional form of d
c
ni) would be
computationally challenging – each specification takes several days to estimate, and one needs to check that the
local minima are global minima – but not impossible.
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input use crosses the firm border or not – what matters is the degree to which intermediate
input cost shares are explained by enforcement costs. At the same time, if the use of primary
factors was also associated with contracting frictions d˜, the regression would only identify the
net of the two frictions, d/d˜. Our reported welfare counterfactual would hence understate the
welfare increases from reducing enforcement costs; likewise if the productivity parameters T or
S were decreasing in enforcement costs.
As transaction costs d decrease, more tasks get outsourced, which results in an increase in
profits (and which then get redistributed to households). Under the above calibration where
markups are 40 percent, roughly half of the increase in Y/P comes from the increase in the
numerator. If the model was re-estimated under the assumption that markups are zero24, the
estimation would instead attribute the observed level of intermediate cost shares to a lower
average productivity under in-house production Sn (recall that Sn and µn are not separately
identified). Welfare gains from reducing d would therefore be lower: markups act like a tax
which is redistributed to households, whereas lower productivity is akin to goods being de-
stroyed.
3.4 Discussion
What do these results tell us about the importance of legal institutions? Note that in the model,
legal institutions affect economic outcomes only through one particular mechanism, namely the
enforcement of supplier contracts. As such, the above welfare estimates do not include other
channels of how legal institutions may matter, such as in the protection of investors: Ponticelli
and Alencar (2016) find that a one-standard deviation improvement in the quality of Brazilian
district courts is associated with firms having 0.5% higher investment over assets and 2.3%
higher output; this is on the same order of magnitude as the results above. Furthermore, the
results above should not be read as saying that the quality of legal institutions matters more
than other types of institutions. In a highly influential paper, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)
argue that contracting institutions matter less for development than property rights institutions
because agents can substitute for the former using informal arrangements. This paper takes
this substitutability seriously, and while settling the question of which aspects of institutions
are more important is outside of its scope, the role of legal institutions in the enforcement of
supplier contracts and in shaping development turns out to be significant.
In the above quantification exercise, we have focused on the monetary cost of enforcement
as a measure of the quality of judicial institutions, and abstracted from other dimensions that
might also affect the firm’s ability to use courts to enforce contracts. The speed of enforcement,
which is also measured by the World Bank, could be included in the cost measure, but when
priced at reasonable interest rates the time cost is only a relatively small fraction of total
cost. The objectivity of judges might be a much more important consideration; unfortunately
it is hard to measure it in a way that allows one to quantify its importance. Most countries
24Note, however, that finite price levels require σn < 1 + θ.
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employ appellate courts precisely to avoid parties being dependent on the decisions of individual
(potentially biased) judges.
As we have seen, the benefits of improving legal institutions can be large — but do they
outweigh the costs? The literature on the determinants of court performance generally finds
no correlation between spending on the judiciary and the efficiency of courts (Buscaglia and
Dakolias, 1999, Cross and Donelson, 2010, Palumbo et al., 2013), and suggests that incentivizing
judges and improving case management are more important. But even if the amount of spending
mattered, it is unlikely that the cost of court reform would outweigh the benefits, since the
counterfactual welfare gains are an order of magnitude larger than countries’ total spending
on the judiciary: the US spends around 0.38 percent of GDP on the judiciary; European
countries on average 0.19 percent. India, a country whose judiciary and industry structure are
symptomatic of the problems discussed here25, spends 0.12 percent of GDP on the judiciary —
but would grow by at least 5%, and possibly much more, if it had US enforcement institutions.26
In light of these numbers, it would be hard to deny the need for judicial reform in India.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the importance of contracting frictions for the firm’s sourcing of interme-
diate inputs. In countries where the cost of enforcing supplier contracts is high, firms use less
externally sourced intermediate inputs in sector pairs where US firms litigate a lot for breach
of contract. The amount of litigation correlates with measures of relationship-specificity of
the intermediate inputs. Hence, this fact is consistent with the view that when legal institu-
tions are good, firms manage to overcome hold-up problems caused by asset specificity through
the possibility of enforcing formal supplier contracts. The paper quantifies the importance of
courts by estimating how much of the distortions in intermediate input use are explained by
contracting frictions. If all countries had access to US courts, per-capita income would rise by
more than three percent for half of all countries, and by more than 4.5 percent for a third of all
countries. These results confirm North’s points about transaction costs shaping macroeconomic
development through the organization of production.
Another lesson is that economists should take great care when using input-output tables.
Input-output tables differ systematically and significantly across countries. They differ system-
atically across countries in the sense that they are correlated with institutions and patterns of
dependence on formal enforcement, and significantly, because the fraction of the variation that
is explained by these frictions suggest that the welfare gains from removing them are large.
25India is host to several strongly vertically integrated conglomerates, like Tata and Reliance, and also to
some of the world’s most congested courts: Narasappa and Vidyasagar (2016) report that 82% of all High Court
cases are between 10 and 15 years old. See Khanna and Palepu (2000) on integration and performance among
Indian firms, and Ahsan (2013) on judicial quality and intermediate input use in India.
26Data on Indian expenditure on the judiciary from India’s Department of Justice (2015) and the Government
of India (2015) for the fiscal year 2014/15, on US expenditures from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2014) for
the year 2010. European data is from Palumbo et al. (2013) and refer to the year 2010.
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Hence, intermediate input expenditure shares are not mere ’technical coefficients’, but are in-
stead the endogenous outcome of firm’s sourcing decisions. In particular, economists should be
cautious of using the United States’ input-output table to describe input use patterns in other
countries.
The last lesson is one for policy. The paper’s findings highlight the importance of judicial
reform: the welfare costs from costly contract enforcement are substantial, and must not be
ignored. In countries with poor courts, improvements in court quality must be sufficiently large
to induce firms to adopt formal contracting practices. Judicial reforms must weigh the benefits
against the costs. They may be targeted to reduce the costs of legal representation, such as in
the case of the United Kingdom (Jackson, 2009), or attempt to clear the backlog of cases and
speed up the litigation and enforcement process.
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A Data Description (Print Appendix)
A.1 Input-Output data
A.1.1 Definition and Sources
My input-output tables are from GTAP, Version 8. GTAP harmonizes the tables from different
sources and years; Table 8 shows which tables are from which year. I aggregate sectors in such
a way that they correspond to ISIC two-digit sectors (all agricultural goods into one sector, all
food products into one sector, and oil and gas into the same sector). The shares Xni/Xn are
the “Value of Firms’ purchases of i, by sector n, in region c at Agents’ prices”, divided by the
sector’s “Value of Firms’ Output at Agents’ prices”. The former is the sum of “Value of Firms’
Domestic Purchases at Agents’ prices” and “Value of Firms’ Imports at Agents’ prices”. Both
values (and hence the shares) originate from the contributed IO table and are harmonized across
countries; the import data is also cross-checked for consistency with Comtrade (see Chapter 7
of the GTAP Documentation).
Table 8—: Source years for the GTAP 8 Input-Output tables
Year Countries
1988 Hong Kong
1991 Zimbabwe
1992 Tanzania
1994 Bangladesh, Botswana, Malawi, Paraguay
1995 Croatia, Mozambique, Tunisia, Zambia
1996 New Zealand, Panama, Senegal, Singapore
1997 Mauritius, Uruguay, Venezuela
1998 Cote D’Ivoire, Turkey
1999 Madagascar, Nigeria, Taiwan
2000 Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom
2001 Azerbaijan, Georgia, Guatemala, Iran, Kenya
2002 Armenia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Laos, Pakistan, Uganda, USA
2003 Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico,
Russia, South Korea
2004 Belarus, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Namibia,
Peru, Ukraine
2005 Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Ghana, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mongolia, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam
2007 China, Nepal, Norway
2008 Switzerland
Note: Source: GTAP 8.
A.1.2 Comparing domestic input shares and total input shares
Broadly speaking, the expenditure shares on domestically sourced intermediate inputs only
(henceforth denoted Xdomni /Xn) are similar to the shares that include both imported and domes-
tically sourced intermediates: the unconditional correlation across all country and sector-pair
observation is 0.83. The sectors for which total and domestic input shares differ most asym-
metrically across countries (as measured by the average standard deviation of log-differences
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of domestic and total input shares, see Table 9) are those whose production depends to a large
extent on natural resouces: oil and gas, coal, petroleum and coal products, and gas manufacture
and distribution. For these inputs, whether they are sourced domestically or imported depends
mostly on the country’s endowment in the respective natural resource. Note that the most
litigation-intensive inputs (Insurance, Business services, and Financial services) do not differ a
lot across countries in their import intensity.
Table 9—: Cross-country Dispersion in Differences between Domestic and Total Input Shares
Sector Dispersion Sector Dispersion
Oil and Gas 3.86 Chemical,rubber,plastic prods 1.07
Coal 2.68 Manufactures nec 1.06
Petroleum, coal products 2.15 Metal products 0.99
Gas manufacture, distribution 1.66 Wood products 0.97
Motor vehicles and parts 1.61 Sea transport 0.94
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat 1.60 Insurance 0.93
Ferrous metals 1.50 Air transport 0.74
Minerals nec 1.49 Food products and beverages 0.73
Electronic equipment 1.48 Construction 0.68
Transport equipment nec 1.47 Business services nec 0.68
Machinery and equipment nec 1.43 Paper products, publishing 0.61
Metals nec 1.36 Trade 0.45
Mineral products nec 1.26 Financial services nec 0.45
Leather products 1.23 Communication 0.41
Recreation and other services 1.22 Transport nec 0.24
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 1.22 Electricity 0.19
Wearing apparel 1.13 Water 0.16
Textiles 1.09
Note: Dispersion is the average standard deviation of within-sector-pair log difference of total and domestic
input expenditure shares: 1N
∑N
n=1
1
|C|−1
∑
c∈C
(
log
(
Xcni
Xcn
/
Xdom,cni
Xcn
)
− log
(
Xcni
Xcn
/
Xdom,cni
Xcn
))2
.
A.1.3 Similarity of Input-Output tables across countries
Figure 4 shows the distribution of pairwise correlations of input shares Xcni/X
c
n. The mean
correlation is .48. Input-output tables are much more similar in OECD countries (light grey
bars); there, the mean correlation is .70.
A.2 Enforcement Cost
The enforcement cost δc is the “Cost (% of claim)” from the World Bank’s Doing Business
Survey, as reported on their website in December 2011. For each country, I use the value for
2005, or, if missing, for the year closest to 2005. Table 22 in Appendix D shows the values for
each country.
A.3 Enforcement-Intensity
A.3.1 Construction of the number of court cases by pair of sectors
I start off with all cases in the ’Federal and State court cases’ repository from LexisLibrary that
are between January 1990 and December 2012 and include ’contract’ as one of the core terms
40
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Country-pair-wise correlation coefficient
All countries OECD only
Figure 4: Pairwise correlation of IO-table expenditure shares
in the court opinion document.27 I then exclude all cases that are filed in a court of appeals,
or a higher court. If there have been any counterclaims, I treat them as separate cases. This
leaves me with 23,261 cases that span 34,219 plaintiffs and 50,599 defendants.
I match the plaintiffs and defendants to the universe of US firms that are contained in the
Orbis database of firms, based on the name strings.28 I use a Fellegi-Sunter matching algorithm
that compares the occurence of bigrams in each possible pairing. The first four characters are
weighted more heavily. If the score is above a threshold (0.92), I consider the match to be
successful. I then match the SIC classifications from Orbis to GTAP sectors, using a hand-
written concordance table, which is partly based on the definition of the GTAP sectors in terms
of CPC or ISIC codes29, and partly on the description of the sectors. Since I am only interested
in the industry of the plaintiff and defendant firms, if both firm names in a candidate pair
contain the same trade name (’bank’,’architects’, etc.), I also regard the pair as matched even
if their matching score is below the threshold.
Table 10 summarizes the results of the matching process. I manage to associate 50.5 percent
of all parties to firms in Orbis. In order to see whether the fraction of matched entries is close
to the number of possible matches, one needs to know the fraction of businesses (or at least
non-individuals) among the plaintiffs and defendants. This information is not available in
LexisLibrary. However, I compare the matching rates with the fraction of business plaintiffs
and defendants in an auxiliary dataset, the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, which
27I thank Jinesh Patel and the legal team at LexisNexis UK for permission to automatically retrieve and
process the LexisLibrary data.
28This includes many US subsidiaries of foreign firms. The total number of US firms in my version of Orbis
is 21,014,945.
29See https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/contribute/concordinfo.asp
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covers (among other things) a sample of 6,802 contract cases in state courts.30 In that dataset,
53.9 percent of all parties are non-individuals, and 49.6 percent are businesses. Even though
it is likely that parties in federal courts are more likely to be businesses and organizations
rather than individuals, this comparison supports the view that I am able to match most of
the relevant parties.
Table 10—: Matching Plaintiffs and Defendants to Orbis Firms: Statistics
Plaintiffs Defendants All
number in pct number in pct number in pct
Handmatched: 169 223 392
Population: 34388 100.0 50822 100.0 85210 100.0
perfect matches 1609 4.7 1551 3.1 3160 3.7
Matches: above threshold 12778 37.2 25838 49.2 37779 44.3
based on trade name 808 2.3 1325 2.6 2133 2.5
Total matches: 15195 44.2 27877 54.9 43072 50.5
Civil Justice Survey: non-individuals 53.9
businesses 49.6
A.3.2 Construction of the proxy for US buyer-seller relationships from Japanese
data
I construct a proxy for the number of buyer-seller relationships by sector pair in the United
States using data on Japanese buyer-supplier linkages from Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR). The
TSR data covers more than 950,000 firms from all sectors of the economy, which is close to the
population of Japanese firms with more than four employees (see Bernard et al., 2015, for a
more detailed description). Its underlying industry classification is based on JSIC, which I map
to the GTAP sectors using a JSIC–NACE concordance provided by Eurostat. I then project
the number of buyer-supplier relationships by pair of GTAP sectors on the number of firms in
upstream and downstream sectors (from the 2004 Establishment and Enterprise Census of the
Japanese Statistics Bureau, again concorded from JSIC) and the IO table expenditure shares
(from GTAP):
log(#links)JPNni = −4.15
(0.29)
+0.70
(0.02)
log(#firms)JPNn +0.57
(0.02)
log(#firms)JPNi +0.13
(0.01)
log
(
Xni
Xn
)JPN
+εˆni
The R2 in this regression is 0.69. I then use this linear model together with data on the number
of US enterprises by sector (from the US Census Bureau, mapped to GTAP using the NAICS–
ISIC concordance) to construct an estimate of the number of buyer-supplier linkages in the
US:
log
(
#̂links
)US
ni
≡ −4.15 + 0.70 log(#firms)USn + 0.57 log(#firms)USi + 0.13 log
(
Xni
Xn
)US
30See US Department of Justice (1996) for a description. In calculating the figures in Table 10 I exclude cases
that pertain to mortgage foreclosure, rental agreements, fraud, and employment.
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(a) z(1) (b) z(2)
Figure 5: Enforcement-intensity z(1) and z(2)
Note: Figure shows the enforcement-intensity measures z(1) and z(2) by sector pair. Selling sector is on the
x-axis, buying sector on the y-axis. Darker shades indicate higher values. Values have been monotonically
transformed to improve readability.
The alternative enforcement-intensity measure is then
z
(2)
ni = (# cases between sectors i and n)
/(
#̂links
)US
ni
.
A.3.3 The resulting enforcement-intensity measures z
(1)
ni and z
(2)
ni
The resulting measures z(1) and z(2) are very similar, with a correlation of 0.85. Most of the
variation is driven by characteristics of the selling sector: 18.5% of the overall variation in z
(1)
ni is
explained by upstream sector dummies (18.7% for z
(2)
ni ), and only 8.4% (6.8%) by downstream
sector dummies.
Figure 5 shows the values of z(1) by sector pair, with higher values marked in a darker
shade of grey. Observe that the measures vary considerably across buying sectors within selling
sectors: columns are not uniformly of the same shade. Reading through Lexis’ case summaries
yields a sense for why the litigiosity measures look the way they do.
The first observation is that contracts with firms from the same sector are, on average,
more litigious than with other buyers (i.e. the diagonal is darker in Figure 5a). This is not
only because there are disproportionally many vertical relationships within the same sector (a
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fact known from input output tables themselves), but particularly because many of the within-
sector disputes arise from horizontal licensing of patents, trademarks, and intellectual property
more generally (examples are, among many others, Verson Corp. vs. Verson International
PLC et al., 93 C 2996 (N.D. Ill. 1993), Zaro Licensing Inc. et al. vs. Cinmar Inc. et al.,
779 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. NY 1991)), sometimes in conjunction with antitrust considerations
(e.g. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. vs. Intel Corp., C 91 20541 JW (N.D. Cal. 1991)). Such
agreements are at the heart of firms’ organizational and technological choices. The Economist
(2017)31 documents a prominent example: the invention of small-scale steel mills and their
subsequent licensing and adoption by other steel producers. Collard-Wexler and De Loecker
(2015) study the associated productivity gains and organizational changes. From an economic
point of view, many (though not all) licensing contracts are highly prone to hold-ups: once
technological knowledge has been shared, it cannot be withdrawn, and may enable the licensee
to build new technologies on top of the licensed ones; similarly, a licensor cannot physically
prevent a licensee from using a copyrighted trademark. In such situations the availability of
formal legal recourse is often indespensable to the establishment of market transactions.
The second observation is that services sectors, in particular Insurance, Business Services,
and Finance, are more litigious than the other sectors. Insurance contracts, by nature, are sub-
ject to the problem of default on the side of insurer, and if the insurance contract cannot be en-
forced, it is worthless. Similarly to licensing agreements, business services and financial services
are prone to hold-ups due to the intangibility of the product. While the enforcement-intensity
of insurance contracts do not vary as much across downstream sectors as other sectors, it is ap-
parent that litigation is more frequent with heavy industry sectors (ferrous metals, machinery,
chemicals, minerals), construction, transportation, and public services (chiefly, healthcare).
Reading the case narratives, one gets the impression that litigation is particularly prevalent
whenever the insurance claims are large. In such cases, the insurer has a stronger incentive to
ex-post renege on the contract.
Figure 5 also shows that litigation is surprisingly high for particular off-diagonal sector
pairs. These pairs are not alike, and there are often particular circumstances associated with
trade between certain sectors that give rise to litigation. In the following discussion I attempt,
based on my reading of the case backgrounds in each industry’s cases in LexisLibrary, an
interpretation why in some sector pairs litigation is particularly prevalent.
In cases between coal suppliers to electricity producers, disputes arise mostly because these
markets use formal contracts that tie trading partners together for a long time, under very
specific (and often strongly regulated) conditions. In Teco Coal Corp. et al. vs. Orlando
Utilities Commission (6:07-CV-444-KKC, E.D. Kent. 2008) the supplier finds these terms to
make its business commercially unviable. In Central Lousiana Electric Co. et al. vs. Dolet
Hills Mining Venture (116 F. Supp. 2d 710 (W.D. Louis. 1999)), parties are in disagreement
on whether the specific clauses of their long-term contract have been satisfied. In each case,
the existence of long-term contracts that strongly ties buyers and suppliers together destroys
31“New technologies could slash the cost of steel production”, The Economist, 9 March 2017.
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the generic nature of a good that might otherwise be traded on a spot market (coal/lignite)
with little litigation arising.
Cases between manufacturers of ferrous metals and metal products, machinery, and trans-
port equipment arise mainly due to disputes about the quality and specifications of the specific
metals. A typical case is Alloys International vs. Aeronca (1:10-cv-293 S.D. Ohio 2012), in
which the plaintiff, a manufacturer of specialized metals, seeks damages for the sunk production
cost of custom-made metal coils after the defendant cancels the order and refuses payment. A
similar debt recovery case is Eliott Brothers Steel Co. vs. Michigan Metals et al. (07-15520,
E.D. Mich. 2008). These cases are close to the stylized hold-up problem in Klein et al. (1978).
Cases between manufacturers of transport equipment and transportation companies often
revolve around claims related to construction, maintenance and repair of maritime vessels (the
latter typically taking place in the shipyards where the ships were built). Examples are United
Rentals North America vs. Maritrend Inc. et al. (OO-3600 T 4, E.D. Louis. 2002) and
Susquehanna Santee Boatworks vs. River Street Ferry (01-4229, E.D. Penn. 2005). Note that
cases related to maritime vessels are more frequent than cases related to aircraft; this is in
line with aircraft being more homogeneous and standardized than ships (see Benmelech and
Bergman’s papers on aircraft as collateral).
Cases where the seller belongs to the machinery and equipment industry are relatively
most frequent in transactions with motor vehicles industry. These contracts typically involve
relationship-specific investments on the side of the supplier, and sometimes also on the side of
the buyer — indeed, they were Monteverde and Teece’s (1982) classic example of relationship-
specific investment. Examples include Techsys Chassis Inc. vs. Sullair Corp. (4:08-cv-203,
E.D. Tex. 20XX), where plaintiff and defendent worked together on a new chassis for one of
defendant’s products, under the agreement that plaintiff would be the exclusive supplier for
these components. This agreement was alleged to have been violated. In Arens Controls Co.
vs. Enova Systems Inc. (08 CV 6994, N.D. Ill. 2012), the plaintiff designed and produced
custom-made power inverters for the defendant; the defendant was alleged to have reneged on
the purchase of some of the power inverters. Similar situations are found in disputes with firms
from the coal, mining, and construction industries.
Cases between electricity companies and heavy industry often revolve around the installation
of electricity-related equipment (transformers, compensators). An example is Structural Metals
vs. S&C Electric Company (SA-09-CV-984-XR, W.D. Tex. 2012). As the power infrastructure
of these factories is typically custom-made and site-specific, hold-ups may arise.
Cases where the supplier is providing an ocean shipping service seem to be more prevalent
when the transported good is a basic raw material (e.g. iron ore) than when it’s a finished
good (toys from China). Cases related to the former often feature problems during the delivery
(contamination of chemicals in Sterling Chemicals Inc. et al. vs. Stolt-Nielsen Inc et al. (97
Civ. 8018, S.D. NY 2004), disappearance of the cargo in Luvata Buffalo Inc. et al. vs. Mol
Mitsui Lines et al. (08-CV-0701(A)(M), W.D. NY 2010). A plausible explanation would be
that in such cases the recipient’s revenue elasticity of the shipped products is higher, therefore
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the value of the claim is higher, which is more likely to lead to litigation. In other words, when
Walmart does not receives a shipment of toys from China it is harmed less than when a steel
company cannot produce because it did not receive its shipment of iron ore. (Normally these
shipments are insured, and often the insurer is an interested party in the case.)
Finally, cases between firms in the PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Education sector and Insur-
ance companies are varied. In some cases they are about regulation of insurers, in others about
contracts between health providers and insurers, as in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. et al.
vs. Allstate Insurance Co. (466 F. Supp. 2d 467, E.D. NY 2006).
A.3.4 Comparing my enforcement-intensity measures to existing measures
I construct measures of dependence on enforcement institutions analogously to Levchenko
(2007), and, similar to Nunn (2007), using the Rauch classification of goods. The measure
similar to Levchenko’s is the Herfindahl index of US intermediate input expenditures, which I
construct from GTAP data (and at the level of aggregation that I use here, which is different
from the one used in Levchenko’s paper):
ln =
N∑
i=1
(
XUSni∑N
i′=1 X
US
ni′
)2
I also construct, for each of my sectors, the fraction of its output in the US that is neither traded
on an organized exchange, nor for which there exists a reference price in a trade publication,
according to Rauch’s (1999) classification for SITC products. This yields measures rconi and
rlibi , using Rauch’s conservative and liberal classification, respectively. Rauch’s classifications
are only available for physical goods, so I set r equal to one for services industries. Analogously
to Nunn (2007), I construct the fraction of a sector n’s inputs that is relationship-specific:
Nunnn =
N∑
i=1
(
XUSni∑N
i′=1X
US
ni′
)
ri
The resulting measures are positively correlated with the averages of z(1) and z(2) by selling
industry. Table 11 shows the Spearman rank correlation coefficients.
Table 11—: Spearman rank correlations between institutional dependency measures
z
(1)
ni z
(2)
ni
Nunnconn 0.14 0.12
Nunnlibn 0.14 0.12
rconi 0.21 0.20
rlibi 0.22 0.21
ln 0.08 0.07
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A.4 Other data
Data for the number of firms by US sector come from Census Bureau Statistics on US Businesses
(for the year 2000; concorded using the official NAICS-SIC concordance and the SIC-GTAP
concordance). Financial development, FINDEV c, is the amount of domestic credit to private
sector as fraction of GDP, in the year 2000, from the World Bank’s World Development Indi-
cators. Data for GDPCc (GDP per capita, PPP adjusted, in constant USD, for the year 2000)
are also from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Finally, Rauch’s classification
of goods was downloaded from James Rauch’s website and concorded to GTAP sectors via
Feenstra’s SITC-HS concordance and the HS-GTAP concordance.
Table 12—: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N
Intermediate Input Share 0.53 0.08 0.25 0.69 109
Domestic Intermediate Input Share 0.37 0.08 0.12 0.58 109
Enforcement Costs δ 0.29 0.22 .088 1.425 109
Enforcement-Intensity z
(1)
ni 2.36·10−5 7.73 ·10−5 0 .0015 1225
Enforcement-Intensity z
(2)
ni 1.13·10−4 4.11 ·10−4 0 .0041 1225
Note: ‘Intermediate input share’ refers to the sum of all intermediate inputs (materials) divided by gross
output. The correlation between z
(1)
ni and z
(2)
ni is 0.85.
B A microfoundation for the contracting frictions (Print
or Online Appendix)
This section presents a contracting game between a buyer and supplier, where relationship-
specific investment leads to hold-up. Contracts are enforceable, but enforcement is costly: the
plaintiff has to pay a fraction δ of the value of the claim to the court. Courts award expectation
damages, i.e. they order damage payments to compensate the innocent party for any loss that
has arisen due to the breach. As in Shavell (1980), this limits the contracting space. In the
presence of δ > 0, the optimal contract does not achieve the first-best. When enforcement
costs are sufficiently low, the outcome improves on the incomplete contract outcome; if they
are higher, parties will prefer the incomplete contract outcome, in which case the distortion
depends only on the degree of relationship-specificity of the produced goods. The resulting
distortion is a special case of the assumed functional form for dni in the main text.
The description of the contracting game proceeds as follows. I first describe the contracting
space, and discuss the timing of events and the enforcement mechanism. I then solve the
contracting game. Going back in time, I describe the problem of finding an optimal contract
and characterize the equilibrium thereunder.
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Figure 6: Timeline of the contracting game
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
Supplier
produces q units,
delivers
min(q, q∗)
Buyer either
pays fee M(q)
or holds up the
supplier
Nash
bargaining to
settle contract
Nash
bargaining over
any excess
production
Buyer receives
R(q)
Buyer and
supplier sign
contract
(q∗,M(q))
B.1 Setup of the contracting game
The contract between buyer and supplier is a pair (q∗,M(·)), where q∗ ≥ 0 is the quantity of
the good to be delivered32, and M : [0, q∗] → R\R− is a nonnegative, increasing real-valued
function that represents the stipulated payment to the supplier. M(q∗) is the agreed fee. If
M(q) < M(q∗) for q < q∗, this represents damage payments that are agreed upon at the time
of the formation of the contract, for enforcement in case of a breach of contract (“liquidated
damages”).33 I will explain the exact enforcement procedure after stating the timing of events.
Timing of events:
1. The buyer and the supplier sign a contract (q∗,M(q)) which maximizes the buyer’s pay-
off, subject to the supplier’s payoff being nonnegative. At this point the buyer cannot
perfectly commit to paying M(q) once production has taken place, other than through
the enforcement mechanism explained below.
2. The supplier produces q units. He chooses q optimally to maximize his profits. I assume
that if q < q∗, he delivers all the produced units; if q ≥ q∗, he delivers q∗ and retains
control of the remaining units.A unit that has been delivered is under the control of the
buyer.
3. The buyer decides whether or not to hold up the supplier by refusing to pay M(q).
4. If the contract has been breached (either because q < q∗ or because the buyer did not
pay the fee M(q)), either party could enforce the contract in a court. The outcome of
enforcement is deterministic, and enforcement is costly. Hence, the two parties avoid this
ex-post efficiency loss by settling out of court. They split the surplus using the symmetric
Nash sharing rule, whereby each party receives the payoff under the outside option (i.e.
the payoff under enforcement), plus half of what would have been lost to them in the case
of enforcement (the enforcement costs). I explain the payoffs under enforcement below.
32The supplier’s chosen quantity q may likewise be interpreted as quality of the product, or effort. The legal
literature calls this relationship-specific investment reliance (Hermalin et al., 2007).
33Most jurisdictions impose strong limits on punishment under these clauses. In English law, in terrorem
clauses in contracts are not enforced (Treitel, 1987, Chapter 20). German and French courts, following the
Roman tradition of literal enforcement of stipulationes poenae, generally recognize penal clauses in contracts,
but will, upon application, reduce the penalty to a ’reasonable’ amount (BGB § 343, resp. art. 1152 & 1231,
code civil, and Zimmermann, 1996, Chapter 4). Given my assumptions on the courts awarding expectation
damages (see below), any restrictions on M are not going to matter.
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5. In case the supplier has retained control over some of the produced units, q − q∗, the
two parties may bargain over them. Again I assume that they split the surplus according
to the symmetric Nash sharing rule. Since there is no contract to govern the sale of
these goods, the outside option is given by the supplier’s option to revert the production
process.
6. The buyer receives revenue/utility R(q).
Enforcement:
After the buyer’s decision whether or not to hold up the supplier, either party may feel
that they have been harmed by the other party’s actions: the supplier may have produced less
than what was specified (q < q∗), and the buyer may have withheld the fee M(q). Either party
may enforce the contract in the court. The court perfectly observes all actions by both parties,
and awards expectation damages as a remedy. The basic principle to govern the measurement
of these damages is that an injured party is entitled to be put “in as good a position as one
would have been in had the contract been performed” (Farnsworth (2004), §12.8). The precise
interpretation of this rule is as follows:
• If the supplier has breached the contract, q < q∗, he has to pay the buyer the difference
between the buyer’s payoff under fulfillment, R(q∗) −M(q∗), and under breach, R(q) −
M(q). Hence, he has to pay
D(q, q∗) = R(q∗)−M(q∗)− (R(q)−M(q)) .
• In addition, if the buyer has not paid the fee M(q), the court orders him to do so.
It is important to stress that the resulting net transfer may go in either direction, depending on
whether or not the parties are in breach, and on the relative magnitude of M(q) and D(q, q∗).
I assume furthermore that the plaintiff has to pay enforcement costs, which amount to a
fraction δ of the value of the claim to him. The value of the claim is the net transfer to him that
would arise under enforcement.34 These costs include court fees, fees for legal representation
and expert witnesses, and the time cost. The assumption that enforcement costs are increasing
in the value of the claim is in line with empirical evidence (Lee and Willging, 2010), and also
strengthens the link between the model and the empirical analysis in the main text: my data for
enforcement costs are given as a fraction of the value of the claim. In line with the situation in
the United States, I assume that enforcement costs cannot be recovered in court (Farnsworth,
2004, §12.8).35
34If the net transfer is negative, he would not have chosen to enforce in the first place. However, the other
party would then have had an incentive to enforce, and would have been the plaintiff. I show later that in
equilibrium the plaintiff is always the supplier.
35Many countries have the enforcement costs paid by the losing party (’cost shifting’). See Jackson (2009a)
for a comparative analysis. While cost shifting may mean that in some circumstances punishment would be
possible and therefore higher quantities could be implemented, the resulting model does not allow for closed-form
solutions.
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B.2 Solving for the equilibrium of the contracting game:
I solve for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, which, for a given contract, consists of the
supplier’s production choice qs and the buyer’s holdup decision, as a function of q. The holdup
decision function gives the buyer’s optimal response to a produced quantity q, and the optimal
production choice qs is then the supplier’s optimal quantity q, taking the holdup decision
function as given. The full solution of the game is in Appendix C. Here, I discuss the intuition
for the optimal responses and the payoff functions.
Case 1: Seller breaches the contract. Consider first the case where the supplier decides to
breach, q < q∗. The buyer refuses to pay M(q), in order to shift the burden of enforcement (and
thus the enforcement costs) on the supplier. Hence, in the case of enforcement, the supplier
would receive a net transfer of M(q)−D(q, q∗). This transfer is positive: if it was negative, the
supplier’s overall payoff would be negative and he would not have accepted the contract in the
first place. Thus, under enforcement, the supplier would be the plaintiff and would have to pay
the enforcement costs. To avoid the efficiency loss, the two parties bargain over the surplus and
settle outside of court. Under the symmetric Nash sharing rule each party receives its outside
option (the payoff under enforcement) plus one half of the quasi-rents (the enforcement costs).
Thus, the supplier’s overall payoff under breach is
(18) pis (q,M, q
∗) = (1− δ) (M(q)−D(q, q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff under enforcement
+
1
2
δ (M(q)−D(q, q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
quasi-rents
− qcni(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production cost
if q < q∗. Since D(q, q∗) = R(q∗)−M(q∗)− (R(q)−M(q)), the above simplifies to
(19) pis (q,M, q
∗) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(q)−R(q∗) +M(q∗))− qcni(j) if q < q∗.
Note that the buyer’s revenue function R appears in the supplier’s payoff function. This is due
to the courts awarding expectation damages: the fact that damage payments are assessed to
compensate the buyer for forgone revenue means that the supplier internalizes the payoff to the
buyer. The enforcement costs δ govern the supplier’s outside option, and hence the settlement:
higher enforcement costs means that the supplier can recover a smaller fraction of his fee net of
damages; therefore, the terms of the settlement are worse for him. Note also that the contract
(q∗,M) enters (19) only through q∗ and M(q∗), and only in an additive manner. This is because
the court awards damages such that the sum of liquidated damages and expectation damages
exactly compensates the buyer. If enforcement costs δ were zero, the expectations damages
rule would ensure an outcome that is efficient within the bilateral relationship.36
Case 2: Seller fulfills the contract. Consider next the case where the supplier fulfills his
36This point was first made by Shavell (1980), who argued that when courts assign expectation damages,
the parties may achieve first-best even if the contractually specified payoff is not state-contingent. Similarly, I
argue here that under expectation damages the state-contingent payoffs do not matter, and that the presence
of proportional enforcement costs then leads to efficiency loss.
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part of the contract, q ≥ q∗. He delivers q∗ units to the buyer, and keeps the remaining units to
himself. As in the case above, the buyer refuses to pay the fee M(q∗): subsequent enforcement
of the contract would leave the seller with a payoff of only (1 − δ)M(q∗); hence, under the
settlement with the symmetric Nash solution, the buyer only has to pay (1− 1
2
δ)M(q∗). After
the settlement of the contract, the two parties may bargain over the remaining q−q∗ units. The
Nash sharing rule leaves the supplier with its outside option (what he would get by reversing
the production process for the q−q∗ units) plus one half of the quasi-rents. Thus, the supplier’s
overall profits are
pis (q,M, q
∗) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contract payoff
+ωnicni(j) (q − q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff under reverting
+
1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗)− ωnicni(j) (q − q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
quasi-rents
− qcni(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production cost
(20)
if q ≥ q∗. Hence, even in the case where the supplier fulfills his part of the contract, the contract
(q∗,M) only enters additively in the supplier’s payoff function. The terms of the bargaining
that governs the marginal return on production are now given by the degree of relationship-
specificity. A higher degree of relationship-specificity, captured by a lower ωni, worsens the
supplier’s outside option and hence lowers his payoff under the settlement.
Going back in time, the supplier chooses q to maximize his profits, given piecewise by
(19) and (20). The supplier’s profit function is continuous at q∗, and the shape of the ex-
ante specified payoff schedule M does not affect pis. This means that the buyer is unable to
punish the supplier for producing less than the stipulated quantity, and q < q∗ may happen in
equilibrium.
The Optimal Contract:
I now turn to the buyer’s problem of finding an optimal contract. He chooses a contract
(q∗,M) that maximizes his payoff pib subject to participation by the supplier,
(q∗,M) = arg max(qˆ∗,Mˆ) pib
(
qs(qˆ∗, Mˆ), qˆ∗, Mˆ
)
(21)
s.t. pis
(
qs(qˆ∗, Mˆ), Mˆ , qˆ∗
)
≥ 0(22)
where qs(qˆ∗, Mˆ) is the supplier’s profit-maximizing quantity,
qs(qˆ∗, Mˆ) = arg maxq≥0 pis(q, Mˆ , qˆ∗).
Since there is no ex-post efficiency loss, the buyer’s payoff pib is the total surplus minus the
supplier’s payoff,
pib
(
q, Mˆ , qˆ∗
)
= R(q)− qcni(j)− pis
(
q, Mˆ , qˆ∗
)
.
In the solution to the contracting game above, I have shown that a contract (q∗,M) enters
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the payoff functions in each case only in an additive manner. Therefore, by setting q∗ and
M , the buyer can only influence the supplier’s decision by shifting the threshold for breach q∗.
In choosing an optimal contract, the buyer thus decides whether he wants to implement the
interior maximum in the case of breach by the seller (case 1), or the interior maximum in case of
fulfillment by the supplier (case 2). He will choose the case that is associated with the smaller
amount of distortions. The following proposition formalizes this intuition, and characterizes
the equilibrium under an optimal contract. It describes (1) the produced quantity, (2) whether
the equilibrium features a breach or a fulfillment by the seller, and (3) the distribution of the
rents between the two parties. Appendix C contains the proof.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium under an optimal contract) An optimal contract (q∗,M) sat-
isfies the following properties:
1. The quantity implemented, qs(q
∗,M), satisfies
(23)
dR(q)
dq
∣∣∣∣
q=qs(q∗,M)
= min
(
2− ωni, 1
1− 1
2
δ
)
c
2. qs(q
∗,M) < q∗ if and only if (1− 1
2
δ)−1 < 2− ωni.
3. The whole surplus from the relationship goes to the buyer:
pis (qs(q
∗,M),M, q∗) = 0
To interpret this result, it is helpful to compare the equilibrium quantity qs(q
∗,M) to the
first-best quantity q˜, which is defined as the quantity that maximizes the overall surplus from
the relationship,
q˜ ≡ arg maxq≥0R(q)− qcni(j).
The first statement of Proposition 4 says that the equilibrium quantity produced under an
optimal contract, qs(q
∗,M), is lower than the first-best quantity q˜ (recall that R is concave,
and that 2−ωni > 1). The intuition for the efficiency loss depends on whether the equilibrium
features a breach or a fulfillment by the supplier. If the supplier breaches by producing q < q∗,
the presence of proportional enforcement costs mean that the supplier could only recover a
smaller fraction of his fee net of damages by going to court. Under the settlement he does not get
the full return on his effort, which causes him to ex-ante produce less than the efficient quantity.
Note that in the absence of enforcement costs (δ = 0), the supplier completely internalizes the
buyer’s payoff through the expectation damages, and the resulting outcome would be first-
best. The magnitude of the efficiency loss in this case depends solely on the magnitude of
enforcement costs. In the case where the supplier fulfills his part of the contract, q ≥ q∗, the
degree of relationship-specificity governs the supplier’s outside option in the bargaining, and
thus the marginal return on production. A higher relationship-specificity (lower ωni) means
that the supplier’s outside option becomes worse, which results in a lower payoff under the
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settlement. The supplier anticipates the lower ex-post return on production, and produces less
(Klein et al., 1979).
The second statement says that the optimal contract implements a breach by the seller if
and only if the cost of enforcement is low compared to the degree of relationship-specificity.
Given that it is impossible to implement the efficient quantity, the optimal contract implements
the case with the lower associated distortions (hence also the minimum function in expression
(23)). If the cost of enforcement is relatively low, the optimal contract implements a breach by
setting a high q∗: after the hold-up, the control over the produced units is with the buyer, and
the supplier’s only asset is the enforceable contract whose value depends on the (relatively low)
enforcement costs. On the other hand, when the degree of relationship-specificity is low and
enforcement costs are high, the optimal contract will pick a low q∗ to allocate the residual rights
of control over the excess production q − q∗ with the supplier. In that case, his ex-post return
on production depends on his ability to reverse the production (i.e. the parameter ωni). Hence,
the optimal contract maximizes the surplus by maximizing the producer’s ex-post return on
production.37
The third statement says that the above is implementable while still allocating the whole
surplus from the relationship to the buyer. This is not trivial, since the supplier’s payoff
schedule M is required to be nonnegative.
The reader may be concerned about the possibility of ’overproduction’ (q > q∗) arising
as an equilibrium outcome in the model despite there being little evidence on this actually
happening in practice. The right way to interpret such an equilibrium is as an outcome to an
informal contract, where the option to enforce the claim in a court is either non-existent or
irrelevant. Indeed, a contract where M = 0 and q∗ = 0 would be equivalent to the situation
where enforceable contract are not available, as in the literature on incomplete contracts (Klein
et al., 1979, and others). The only reason why the optimal contract in this case features a small
but positive q∗ is because this allows the buyer to obtain the full surplus from the relationship.
If I allowed for an ex-ante transfer from the supplier to the buyer, setting q∗ and M to zero
would be an optimal contract in the case where the degree of relationship-specificity is relatively
low compared to enforcement costs.38
To summarize, the main benefit of having enforceable contracts is that when the stipulated
quantity q∗ is sufficiently high, the degree of relationship-specificity does not matter for the
resulting allocation and the ex-ante investment. The drawback is that the presence of enforce-
ment costs distorts the supplier’s decision. Hence, choosing a high q∗ will only be optimal if
the degree of relationship-specificity is sufficiently high, so that the efficiency loss associated
with a breach is lower than the efficiency loss associated with an unenforceable contract.
The model also yields a qualitative prediction on the occurrence of breach.
37This is similar to the optimal allocation of property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore,
1990).
38The model thus makes a case for the possible desirability of informal contracts: if the degree of relationship-
specificity is low and enforcement costs are high, it is preferable to choose an informal contract rather than
specifying a high q∗ and have the supplier underperform due to the presence of high enforcement costs.
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Corollary 1 (Relationship-specificity and breach) Let δ < 1 and the parties sign an op-
timal contract. Then, for sufficiently high degree of relationship-specificity (i.e. for a sufficiently
low ωni) the seller breaches the contract in equilibrium.
If litigation can only happen in the case of breach, then this means that litigation should be
more frequent when goods are more relationship-specific.
C Proofs (Online Appendix)
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4
A contract is a pair (q∗,M(q)) where q∗ ≥ 0 and M : [0, q∗]→ R\R− is a nonnegative increasing
function. I call a contract C feasible if there is a quantity q ≥ 0 such that the ex-ante profit
from the relationship to the seller if he produces q, pis(C, q), is nonnegative. Feasible contracts
will be accepted by a potential supplier. Moreover, I call a quantity qˆ ≥ 0 implementable if
there is a feasible contract C such that the seller decides to produce qˆ once he has accepted
the contract (i.e. qˆ = arg maxq pis(C, q)). Finally, a feasible contract C is optimal if the payoff
to the buyer under the seller’s optimal production choice is maximal in the class of feasible
contracts (i.e. Cˆ is optimal if Cˆ = arg maxC, C feasible pib(C, arg maxq pis(C, q))).
Suppose the buyer and seller have signed a feasible contract C. The first step is to find the
payoff functions for the buyer and seller, pib and pis. Let q be the produced quantity. Distinguish
two cases:
1. The seller decides to breach the contract by producing less than the stipulated quantity:
q < q∗. The buyer will then hold up the seller by refusing to pay M(q). I will show later
that this is indeed optimal. If one of the two parties decides to go to court, the court
would (i) order the buyer to pay the agreed fee M(q) to the seller, (ii) order the seller to
pay damages to compensate the buyer for the loss that has arisen due to breach. Under
fulfillment of the contract, the buyer should receive the proceeds from selling q∗ to the
downstream firm, R(q∗), minus the fee paid to the seller, M(q∗). Thus, the amount of
damages are
(24) D(q, q∗) ≡ R(q∗)−M(q∗)− (R(q)−M(q)) .
The plaintiff also has to pay enforcement costs. In order to determine who the plaintiff
would be, I need to distinguish between two subcases.
(a) M(q) − D(q, q∗) > 0. In this case the fee that the seller would receive exceed the
damages that he would have to pay, thus the seller would have an incentive to go to
court. If he did that, he would receive the above amount minus enforcement costs,
which amount to a fraction δ of the value of the claim. Thus, under enforcement,
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the supplier would get
(25) (1− δ) (M(q)−D(q, q∗)) ,
whereas the buyer would get the revenue from selling to the downstream firm, net
of fees M(q) and plus damage payments
(26) R(q) +D(q, q∗)−M(q).
From the definition of the damages (24) it is easy to see that the latter equals
R(q∗) −M(q∗). Since enforcement entails a social loss of δ (M(q)−D(q, q∗)), the
buyer and seller will bargain over the surplus and settle out of court. (25) and (26)
are the seller’s and buyer’s outside options in the Nash bargaining. The symmetric
solution in the bargaining leaves each party with its outside option and one-half of
the quasi-rents (surplus minus the sum of outside options). Thus, the total payoffs
under breach are, respectively
pis(q) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(M(q)−D(q, q∗))− cq if q < q∗(27)
pib(q) = R(q)−
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(M(q)−D(q, q∗)) if q < q∗
Comparing pib here with the payoff in case the buyer did not hold up the seller,
R(q) −M(q), shows that it is preferable for the buyer to hold up. Note that since
the buyer already has control over the produced goods, the seller cannot revert the
production process.
(b) M(q) − D(q, q∗) < 0. In this case, the damages paid to the buyer exceed the fee
that he would have to pay to the seller. The buyer thus has an incentive to enforce
the contract in a court, and would have to pay the enforcement costs. Thus, under
enforcement, the seller’s payoff is
M(q)−D(q, q∗)
and the buyer’s payoff is
R(q) +D(q, q∗)−M(q)− δ (D(q, q∗)−M(q)) .
The two parties settle outside of court using the symmetric Nash sharing rule; each
receives its outside option (i.e. payoff under enforcement) plus one half of the quasi-
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rents (enforcement costs). Thus, the seller’s ex-ante payoff is
pis (q) = M(q)−D(q, q∗) + 1
2
δ (D(q, q∗)−M(q))− cq
=
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(M(q)−D(q, q∗))− cq < 0
Since the ex-ante payoff of the seller is negative and I am only considering feasible
contracts (i.e. the seller’s payoff function is nonnegative for some q), this case will
never be chosen by the seller.
2. Fulfillment of the contract, q ≥ q∗. The supplier delivers q∗ units and holds back the
rest. The buyer holds up the supplier by refusing to pay M(q∗) (again, comparing this
to the non-hold-up payoff shows that this is optimal). If the supplier goes to court to
claim his payment, he would receive M(q∗) minus the enforcement costs δM(q∗). The
court awards no damages, since there has not been any loss in value.39 Since going
to court entails a welfare loss, the parties are going to settle outside of court using the
symmetric Nash sharing rule. Under the settlement the supplier receivesM(q∗)−δM(q∗)+
1
2
δM(q∗) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗), and the buyer receives R(q∗) − M(q∗) + 1
2
δM(q∗). Once
this is done, there may be excess production q − q∗ left, which is still more valuable
to the buyer than to the seller. Again, the two parties bargain over the surplus from
these goods, which is the additional revenue from selling the excess production to the
downstream firm, R(q) − R(q∗). Since there is no contract governing the sale of these
goods, the seller is left with the option to revert the production process if the bargaining
breaks down, in which case he gets ωc (q − q∗) (whereas the buyer gets nothing40). The
quasi-rents are the difference between the surplus and the sum of the outside options,
R(q)−R(q∗)−ωc (q − q∗). Under the Nash sharing rule, the supplier receives in addition
to his payoff from the settlement of the contract dispute
ωc (q − q∗) + 1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗)− ωc (q − q∗)) = 1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗) + ωc (q − q∗))
which means that his overall ex-ante payoff is
(28) pis(q) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗) +
1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗) + ωc (q − q∗))− cq if q ≥ q∗
and the buyer receives in the second settlement
1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗)− ωc (q − q∗))
39Cf. Farnsworth (2004), §12.10 in US law.
40These payoffs are in addition to the payoffs from the first bargaining (R(q∗)− 12δM(q∗) and (1− 12δ)M(q∗)
for the buyer and supplier, respectively).
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which means his total ex-ante payoff is
pib(q) = R(q
∗)−
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗) +
1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗)− ωc (q − q∗)) if q ≥ q∗.
I have now characterized the payoff functions for seller and buyer, for a given contract.
Going back in time, the supplier chooses q optimally to maximize his ex-ante payoff pis. Let’s
first establish that the supplier’s payoff function is continuous at q∗, which means that it is
impossible to punish him for breaching the contract.
Lemma 1 Let (q∗,M(q)) be a feasible contract. The supplier’s payoff function pis is continuous
at q∗.
Proof. The left-limit of pis at q
∗ only exists if q∗ > 0, in which case it is
lim
q↗q∗
pis(q) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)− cq∗
and the right-limit of pis(q) at q
∗ is
lim
q↘q∗
pis(q) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)− cq∗
which is the same as the left-limit, thus pis is continuous at q
∗.
Let’s now look at the set of implementable quantities. The seller’s payoff maximization
problem is
(29) max
q
pis(q) = max
(
max
q,q<q∗
pis(q), max
q,q≥q∗
pis(q)
)
.
Denote the interior maxima of (27) and (28) by qδ and qω respectively. They satisfy the first-
order conditions
R′(qδ) =
1
1− 1
2
δ
c
R′(qω) = (2− ωi) c.
From (29) and the fact that both expressions pis(q) for q < q
∗ and q ≥ q∗ have unique maxima
at qδ and qω respectively, it is clear that the arg maxq pis(q) can only be either qδ, qω, or q
∗.
Because of the continuity of pis, q
∗ can only be implementable if either q∗ ≤ qδ or q∗ ≤ qω.41
Also, note that both qδ and qω do not depend on the contract (q
∗,M(q∗)) – though whether
they will be chosen by the supplier depends of course on the contract.
I now turn to the optimal contracting problem. In a world where the Coase Theorem holds,
the buyer would implement the efficient quantity q˜ = arg maxq R(q) − cq and appropriate all
41Suppose q∗ > qδ and q∗ > qω. Because of continuity of pis and the fact that R is concave, either pis(qδ) >
pis(q
∗) or pis(qω) > pis(q∗), thus q∗ is not implementable.
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the rents from the relationship. In the world of my model, since the implementable quantities
are all less or equal42 q˜, a contract that implements the largest implementable quantity (either
qδ or qω) and leaves the full surplus from the relationship with the buyer will be an optimal
contract. In the following I will construct such a contract. Distinguish two cases:
1. Case 1, 2 − ωi ≥ 1/(1 − 12δ), or, equivalently, qω ≤ qδ. In this case, choosing q∗ to be
greater than qδ and setting
M(q) = M(q∗) =
1
1− 1
2
δ
cqδ +R(q
∗)−R(qδ)
will implement qδ. The seller’s payoff under q = qδ is then zero, and the buyer receives
R(qδ)− cqδ.
2. Case 2, 2− ωi < 1/(1− 12δ), or, equivalently, qω > qδ. The buyer wants to implement qω.
Set M(q∗) = 0 and q∗ such that
(30) R(qω)− (2− ωi) qωc = R(q∗) + ωiq∗c.
Such a q∗ exists because the RHS of this equation is zero for q∗ = 0 and goes to infinity
for q∗ → ∞, and is continuous in q∗, and the LHS is positive. Furthermore, it satisfies
q∗ < qω. Distinguish two subcases.
(a) q∗ ≥ qδ. Then the greatest profit that could be obtained by breaking the contract is(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(qδ) +M(q
∗)−R(q∗))− cqδ
=
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(qδ)−R(q∗))− cqδ < 0
thus q = qω is incentive-compatible.
(b) q∗ < qδ. Since pis(q) is increasing for all q < q∗, an upper bound for the profits that
could be obtained by breaking the contract is(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(q∗) +M(q∗)−R(q∗))− cq∗ = −cq∗ < 0
thus q = qω is incentive-compatible.
Thus, setting M(q∗) = 0 and q∗ as in (30) implements qω with pis(qω) = 0.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 1
1. We have
pni(j) = min
(
plni(j), p
x
ni(j)
)
42Equal if and only if either ω = 1 or δ = 0.
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and
plni(j) =
w
sni(j)
pxni(j) =
σn
σn − 1
pidni
zni(j)
.
From zni(j) following a Fre´chet distribution,
P (zni(j) < z) = e
−Tiz−θ
we have that
P (plni(j) > c) = exp
(
−Sn
(w
c
)−θ)
and analogous for sni(j),
P (pxni(j) > c) = exp
(
−Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
pidni
c
)−θ)
P (pni(j) < c) = 1− P (pni(j) > c) = 1− exp
(
−Sn
(w
c
)−θ
− Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
pidni
c
)−θ)
= 1− exp
(
−
(
Snw
−θ + Ti
(
σn
σn − 1pidni
)−θ)
cθ
)
= 1− e−Φnicθ
where
(31) Φni =
(
Snw
−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)
.
and µn = σn/ (σn − 1). Denote
Qni =
(∫ 1
0
qni(j)
(σn−1)/σndj
) σn
σn−1
then
yn =
∏
i
Qγnini
Derive the demand function for sector n firms,
min
Qni
∑
i
PniQni s.t. yn = 1
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thus
(32) PniQni = λγni
From plugging this into the formula for yn,
pn ≡ λ =
N∏
i=1
(
Pni
γni
)γni
and similarly
Pni =
(∫
pni(j)
1−σn
)1/(1−σn)
.
The latter becomes, using the distribution of pni(j) above,
Pni =
(∫ 1
0
pni(j)
1−σndj
)1/(1−σn)
=
(∫ ∞
0
θp1−σn+θ−1ni Φnie
−Φnicθdc
)1/(1−σn)
=
(
Γ
(
1− σn + θ
θ
)) 1
1−σn
Φ
− 1
θ
ni
Thus the cost of one unit of yn is
pn =
N∏
i=1
(
αn
γni
Φ
− 1
θ
ni
)γni
where
αn ≡
(
Γ
(
1− σn + θ
θ
)) 1
1−σn
and Φni as defined above.
2. The probability that activity (n, i, j) is outsourced is
pini(j) ≡ P (pxni(j) ≤ plni(j)) =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−Sn
(
σn
σn − 1
w
p
)−θ)
dFpx(p)
=
∫ ∞
0
Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ θpθ−1 exp
(−Φnipθ) dp
= Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ 1
Φni
∫ ∞
0
θpθ−1Φni exp
(−Φnipθ) dp
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Φni
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
and because of a LLN, it is also the fraction of type-i varieties that sector n sources from
sector i. The distribution of cost pni(j) conditional on activity (n, i, j) being outsourced
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is
pni|x(j) ≡ P
(
pni(j) < p|pxni(j) ≤ plni(j)
)
=
1
pini(j)
∫ p
0
exp
(
−Sn
(
σn
σn − 1
w
z
)−θ)
dFpx(z)
=
1
pini(j)
∫ p
0
Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ θzθ−1 exp
(−Φnizθ) dz
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
pini(j)
1
Φni
∫ p
0
Φniθz
θ−1 exp
(−Φnizθ) dz
= 1− e−Φnipθ = P (pni(j) < p)
From this, it follows that the fraction of expenditure on outsourced type-i activities in
total expenditure on type-i activities is also pini(j),∫ 1
0
pini(j)pni|x(j)qni(j)dj∫ 1
0
pni(j)qni(j)
= pini(j) = pini.
Let’s calculate the expenditure on outsourced type-i activities in total expenditure. From
(32), the expenditure share on type-i activities is
PniQni
pnyn
= γni.
Thus, the expenditure share on outsourced type-i activities is
(33)
Xni
pnyn
= γni
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
which is decreasing in dni.
D Robustness checks: reduced-form regressions (Online
Appendix)
D.1 Reduced-form regressions
D.1.1 Domestic Input-Output Shares
Table 13 shows the results of estimating equation (1) when replacing the dependent variable
by the expenditure share on domestically sourced intermediate inputs.
D.1.2 Sensitivity: excluding top 3 sectors
Table 14 shows results estimating 1 but excluding the three most litigious sectors according
to z(1), Insurance, Financial Services, and Business Services, from the sample (columns (1)
and (2)); hence the results are not purely driven by those sectors. In columns (3) and (4),
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Table 13—: Results with expenditure on domestically sourced intermediate inputs
Dependent variable: Xdomni /Xn
(1) (2)
δc × z(1)ni -0.036∗∗∗
(0.010)
δc × z(2)ni -0.026∗∗
(0.0084)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes
R2 0.465 0.465
Observations 133525 133525
Note: Dependent variable is the fraction of expenditure of sector n on domestic inputs from sector i in country
c in total gross output of sector n in country c. Table shows standardized betas, with standard errors clustered
at the country level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
the regression explicitly controls for an interaction of enforcement costs with the US input-
output shares, showing that the litigation ratio is not just proxying for unobserved buyer-seller
relationships. In all specifications the coefficient of the interaction of enforcement costs with
enforcement-intensity remains negative and statistically significant.
Table 14—: Sensitivity: excluding top 3 sectors
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δc × z(1)ni -0.021∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.0075)
δc × z(2)ni -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0053)
δc ×XUSni /XUSn -0.041 -0.044
(0.024) (0.024)
Sample Excl. I/F/B Excl. I/F/B Full Full
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.541 0.541 0.538 0.538
Observations 122080 122080 133525 133525
Note: The first two columns exclude pairs where the upstream sector belongs to the three most litigious sectors
(Insurance, Financial Services, and Business Services). Table shows standardized betas, with standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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D.1.3 Heterogeneity by degree of differentiation of downstream sector
Table 15 further interacts δc × zni with the fraction rn of the downstream sector’s products
that are traded on organized exchanges or for which there is a reference price listed in a trade
publication, as indicated by Rauch’s (1999) classification. Products that are traded on organized
exchanges are more homogeneous. If the interaction δc × zni × rn has a negative coefficient, it
would suggest that contracting frictions lead firms to change the products they produce (e.g.
a car producer in India might produce low-tech cars instead of high-tech cars if contracting
frictions prevent the sourcing of tailored electronics components). Table 15 suggests that this
is not the case. If anything, the coefficient tends to be positive.
Table 15—: Homogeneous vs Non-homogeneous Downstream Sectors
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δc × z(1)ni -0.043∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.022)
δc × z(2)ni -0.037∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0085)
δc × z(1)ni × rlibn 0.035
(0.018)
δc × z(2)ni × rlibn -0.011
(0.0087)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.537
Observations 133525 133525 133525 133525
Note: rlibn is the fraction of sector n’s products that are traded on organized exchanges, or reference-priced
in a trade publication, based on Rauch’s liberal classification. Results are very similar when using Rauch’s
conservative measure. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
D.1.4 Results with Rauch/Nunn measure
Table 16 shows the results from running specification (1) where the enforcement-intensity vari-
able is replaced by a measure of relationship-specificity that is constructed from the Rauch
(1999) classification of goods: ri measures the fraction of sector i’s products that are traded on
an organized exchange or where reference prices are listed in trade publications. The resulting
measure is hence similar to what Nunn (2007) uses to describe relationship-specificity. The
point estimates of the interaction term coefficient come out as statistically significant at the 5%
level when using Rauch’s conservative classification, and marginally insignificant when using
the the liberal classification. This may be due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
across upstream sectors and countries, a problem that can be avoided by using the bilateral
enforcement-intensity measure.
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Table 16—: Results when using Rauch’s classification of goods
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2)
δc × rconi -0.025∗
(0.012)
δc × rlibi -0.020
(0.011)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes
R2 0.454 0.454
Observations 133525 133525
Note: Independent variable is an interaction of enforcement cost with the fraction of the upstream sector’s
goods that are traded on an organized exchange or reference-priced in trade publications (according to Rauch’s
(1999) liberal and conservative classifications). Table shows standardized betas, with standard errors clustered
at the country level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
D.1.5 Alternative construction of z-measure
Table 17 shows results when the enforcement-intensity variables is constructed in different ways
that avoid using the US IO table. Columns (1) and (2) refer to the z-measures when assuming
that the plaintiff is the seller and the defendant is the buyer (as opposed to using the relative
sales volumnes in the I-O table). Column (3) constructs a litigation ratio just by dividing the
number of cases in each sector-pair by the number of buyer-seller links between the two sectors
in the Japanese TSR data.
Table 17—: Alternative z-measures
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2) (3)
δc × z˜(1)ni -0.043∗∗∗
(0.010)
δc × z˜(2)ni -0.029∗∗
(0.0096)
δc × (Cases / Links in Japan)ni -0.0079∗
(0.0038)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.537 0.537 0.542
Observations 133525 133525 118701
Note: z˜(1) and z˜(2) are the measures z(1) and z(2) but with plaintiffs/defendants assumed to belong to the
selling/buying industry. (Cases / Links in Japan) is the number of cases by sector pair divided by the raw
number of relationships between these sectors in Japan (using data from Bernard et al. (2015)). Table shows
standardized betas, with standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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D.1.6 Controlling for interactions with the US input-output table
Table 18 addresses the concern that the bilateral measure of dependence on enforcement could
be proxying for the input output table. I repeat the regressions from 4 but also control for
interactions of variables u(1) and u(2) that are constructed analogously to z(1) and z(2) but use
the US input output table in the numerator instead of the number of cases by sector-pair:
u
(1)
ni =
(
XUSni /X
US
n
)√
(# firms in sector i) (# firms in sector n)
(34)
u
(2)
ni =
(
XUSni /X
US
n
)
̂(# buyer-seller relationships between i and n)
(35)
Including these controls does not affect the magnitude nor statistical significance of the
main interactions of interest. The controls with u are all not statistically different from zero.
D.1.7 Controlling for interactions of Nunn and Rauch measures
Table 19 shows the baseline results when adding interactions of the Nunn measure (by down-
stream industry, constructed using the US IO table) with the upstream industry’s Rauch mea-
sure and the country’s enforcement cost δc. Our interactions of interest remain large and
statistically significant; the controls are not statistically significant. The enforcement-intensity
measures hence add explanatory power beyond those used in the existing literature.
D.1.8 PPML estimates of the reduced-form specifications
Table 20 shows the results from estimating the reduced-form specification (1) using a Poisson
Pseudo-ML estimator. This specification is somewhat closer to the structural specification from
Section 3.
E Robustness of the structural estimates: substitution
of broad input baskets (Online Appendix)
This section shows results from the quantitative exercise when the sectoral production functions
exhibit more substitutability across the broad sets of inputs than what is implied by the Cobb-
Douglas functional form used in section 2. Specifically, we assume that the production function
takes a CES form. Equation (4) is replaced by
(36) yn =
(
N∑
i=1
γ
1
ρ
ni
(∫ 1
0
qni(j)
(σn−1)/σndj
) σn
σn−1
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
, n = 1, . . . , N.
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Table 18—: Controlling for interactions with the US I-O table
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
δc × z(1)ni -0.037∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.016∗ -0.018∗
(0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0076) (0.0083)
δc × z(2)ni -0.029∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.015∗
(0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0063)
FINDEV c × z(1)ni 0.045∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.0100) (0.011)
FINDEV c × z(2)ni 0.033∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0090)
logGDPCc × z(1)ni 0.19∗∗ 0.077
(0.063) (0.069)
logGDPCc × z(2)ni 0.14∗∗ 0.056
(0.046) (0.048)
δc × u(1)ni -0.041 -0.030 -0.021 -0.022
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028)
δc × u(2)ni -0.040 -0.030 -0.022 -0.023
(0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027)
FINDEV c × u(1)ni 0.033 0.024
(0.018) (0.020)
FINDEV c × u(2)ni 0.030 0.022
(0.017) (0.019)
logGDPCc × u(1)ni 0.18 0.10
(0.13) (0.15)
logGDPCc × u(2)ni 0.16 0.085
(0.12) (0.14)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Observations 133525 133525 132300 132300 133525 133525 132300 132300
Note: u(1) and u(2) are the z-measures with the number of cases replaced by the US input output table
expenditure shares. Table shows standardized betas, with standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
where, again,
∑
i γni = 1 for all n = 1, . . . , N . The implied expression for the input-output
shares are then
Xcni
Xcn
=

γni
(
αn
(
Scn + T
c
i (µnp
c
id
c
ni)
−θ
)− 1
θ
)1−ρ
∑
j γnj
(
αn
(
Scn + T
c
j
(
µnpcjd
c
nj
)−θ)− 1θ)1−ρ
 T ci (µnpcidcni)−θScn + T ci (µnpcidcni)−θ
The expression in the bracket corresponds to the substitution across broad input baskets; a
choice of ρ = 1 (Cobb-Douglas) reduces the expression to the one from the main text.
Estimating the parameters using a PPML with the conditional mean of the input shares
given by (36) is not straightforward; the parameters ρ and θ are quite collinear. To force the
CES structure on the model, I follow Caliendo et al. (2017) and calibrate the elasticity across
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Table 19—: Controlling for interactions of Nunn and Rauch measures
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δc × z(1)ni -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0094)
δc × z(2)ni -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0073)
δc × rconi ×Nunnconn -0.032 -0.048
(0.039) (0.040)
δc × rlibi ×Nunnlibn -0.018 -0.034
(0.031) (0.032)
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.537
Observations 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525
Note: The table shows the baseline regressions but controlling for interactions of the Nunn (2007) measure (in
the downstream industry) with the Rauch measure (in the upstream industry) and enforcement cost δc. Table
shows standardized betas, with standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Table 20—: PPML estimates of the reduced-form specifications
Dependent variable: Xni/Xn
(1) (2)
δc × z(1)ni -1879.6∗∗∗
(510.7)
δc × z(2)ni -414.5∗∗∗
(94.25)
Estimator PPML PPML
Upstream × Downstream FEs Yes Yes
Upstream × Country FEs Yes Yes
Downstream × Country FEs Yes Yes
R2 0.733 0.733
Observations 133525 133525
Note: The table shows coefficients estimated using a PPML estimator, with standard errors clustered at the
country level. Note that in contrast to the other tables, this table reports non-standardized coefficients. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
broad input baskets to ρ = 4. I also set the productivity draw dispersion to θ = 4, a common
parameter choice in quantitative calibrations of Eaton-Kortum-type models, and close to the
estimates from the main text. The remaining parameters I estimate using the PPML.
Figure 7 shows the welfare counterfactuals under these estimates. The welfare gains from
moving enforcement costs to the levels of the United States are on average slightly smaller
than in the main text, but still in the range of zero to about twenty percent of GDP for
most countries. Overall, the distortions are sufficiently small so that the additional curvature
(ρ > 1) in the production function does not have a strong impact on the welfare effects of
reducing frictions.
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Figure 7: Counterfactual welfare gains from setting enforcement costs to US levels – CES specification
Note: Enforcement costs are top-coded at one to help exposition.
F Results by country, and further details on structural
estimates
Table 21 shows the estimates of the semiparameterically estimated functions dI and dF . Tables
22 and 23 show the results of the welfare counterfactuals from Section 3 for each country.
Table 21—: dI and dF estimates
Calibrated θ, Estimated θ,
Estimated dF Calibrated dF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1 0.26 0.34
(0.007) (0.01)
β2 0.74 0.65
(0.03) (0.03)
η1 1915.05 368.55 2062.97 312.62
(63.24) (13.91) (72.46) (9.73)
η2 -466633.18 -15551.43 -806692.32 -16402.98
(12196.83) (1408.08) (269287.05) (3169.67)
z measure used z(1) z(2) z(1) z(2)
Note: The table shows estimated coefficients for dI = 1 + η1zni + η2η
2
ni and d
F = 1/(1− β1δ − β2δ2).
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Table 22—: Welfare counterfactuals, by country, in percent
Calibrated θ, Estimated θ,
Estimated dF Calibrated dF
Using z(1) Using z(2) Using z(1) Using z(2)
δ to US to zero to US to zero to US to zero to US to zero
Albania ALB 0.39 15.9 31.0 8.7 20.9 12.5 33.5 6.2 20.1
Azerbaijan AZE 0.18 2.6 12.3 2.4 12.8 2.7 18.5 2.3 16.9
Argentina ARG 0.17 1.2 10.5 1.0 10.3 1.2 15.1 0.8 12.2
Australia AUS 0.21 5.3 19.9 4.1 18.4 5.0 27.1 3.1 20.1
Austria AUT 0.13 -1.1 8.9 -0.9 9.4 -1.2 13.9 -0.9 11.6
Bahrain BHR 0.15 0.1 4.9 0.1 5.1 0.1 7.1 0.1 6.1
Bangladesh BGD 0.63 34.1 50.9 16.3 29.8 26.5 48.2 11.5 26.1
Armenia ARM 0.19 2.8 13.2 2.8 13.7 2.8 17.7 2.3 15.1
Belgium BEL 0.18 2.7 15.8 2.2 15.3 2.7 22.8 1.8 17.2
Bolivia BOL 0.33 13.9 30.8 9.2 24.7 11.4 35.1 6.5 24.1
Botswana BWA 0.28 5.8 13.6 3.6 10.7 5.0 15.8 2.4 10.3
Brasil BRA 0.17 1.1 9.7 1.0 10.1 1.1 13.8 0.8 11.8
Bulgaria BGR 0.24 6.8 19.5 5.8 18.9 6.3 24.8 4.4 20.0
Belarus BLR 0.17 1.2 7.9 1.3 8.7 1.2 10.7 1.2 10.0
Cambodia KHM 1.00 42.1 67.6 16.4 32.1 41.5 80.5 14.0 34.0
Cameroon CMR 0.47 18.0 32.5 8.5 19.6 12.7 30.3 5.8 18.1
Canada CAN 0.22 6.4 21.0 4.8 18.8 6.0 28.2 3.6 20.4
Sri Lanka LKA 0.23 4.0 12.7 3.0 11.8 3.6 16.3 2.2 12.6
Chile CHL 0.29 13.8 33.2 9.6 27.8 12.0 41.1 7.2 29.1
China PR CHN 0.11 -1.9 7.3 -1.7 7.9 -2.0 11.3 -1.7 9.9
Taiwan TWN 0.18 2.2 13.0 1.9 13.3 2.2 18.5 1.5 15.4
Colombia COL 0.48 21.4 38.1 10.9 23.7 15.5 37.1 7.2 21.3
Costa Rica CRI 0.24 7.5 20.6 5.2 17.8 6.7 25.7 3.6 18.0
Croatia HRV 0.14 -0.4 10.9 -0.3 11.1 -0.4 16.2 -0.3 13.7
Cyprus CYP 0.16 1.2 11.0 1.0 10.9 1.2 15.9 0.9 13.0
Czech Republic CZE 0.34 18.0 40.1 11.9 31.2 14.9 47.1 8.3 30.2
Denmark DNK 0.25 7.7 21.4 5.7 18.8 7.0 27.4 4.2 19.5
Ecuador ECU 0.27 6.8 16.6 5.3 14.9 6.1 20.0 4.0 15.3
El Salvador SLV 0.19 2.4 10.7 2.1 10.7 2.4 14.8 1.6 12.1
Ethiopia ETH 0.15 0.2 4.6 0.2 4.5 0.2 6.5 0.2 5.2
Estonia EST 0.15 0.3 10.8 0.3 11.2 0.3 15.9 0.3 13.4
Finland FIN 0.13 -0.6 8.3 -0.5 8.6 -0.7 12.5 -0.5 10.4
France FRA 0.17 2.1 13.2 1.8 13.2 2.1 18.8 1.5 15.1
Georgia GEO 0.41 24.0 44.6 15.3 32.4 20.5 51.4 10.8 29.6
Germany DEU 0.14 0.0 9.2 0.0 9.6 0.0 13.9 0.0 11.8
Ghana GHA 0.23 6.4 19.2 5.6 19.6 5.7 23.3 4.3 20.9
Greece GRC 0.14 0.0 7.6 0.0 8.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 9.8
Guatemala GTM 0.27 8.4 21.6 5.9 18.5 7.5 26.5 4.3 19.3
Honduras HND 0.35 15.4 31.7 10.7 25.7 12.5 34.9 7.6 24.6
Hong Kong HKG 0.21 4.1 13.4 2.8 12.1 3.7 17.4 1.9 11.7
Hungary HUN 0.15 0.5 12.8 0.4 13.2 0.5 19.1 0.4 16.1
India IND 0.40 19.6 37.2 13.1 28.5 15.2 39.1 9.4 26.7
Indonesia IDN 1.00 53.5 92.7 18.8 38.3 52.8 116.6 14.3 36.5
Iran IRN 0.17 1.2 8.8 1.1 9.0 1.2 12.2 0.9 10.7
Ireland IRL 0.27 10.8 27.2 7.6 23.1 9.6 34.3 5.6 23.7
Israel ISR 0.25 11.6 32.3 8.2 27.6 10.5 42.1 5.9 28.4
Italy ITA 0.30 14.4 33.7 9.2 26.5 12.2 40.4 6.5 26.3
Cote dIvoire CIV 0.42 22.5 40.0 13.0 27.7 17.0 40.6 9.3 25.8
Japan JPN 0.32 13.9 30.7 8.0 22.3 11.6 36.1 5.5 21.7
Kazakhstan KAZ 0.22 4.7 15.1 4.1 15.1 4.3 19.5 3.3 16.5
Kenya KEN 0.34 10.6 22.2 8.5 19.8 8.7 24.8 6.2 19.3
South Korea KOR 0.10 -3.2 8.8 -2.7 9.8 -3.5 14.4 -2.6 12.8
Kuwait KWT 0.19 1.4 6.5 1.1 6.2 1.3 8.8 0.9 6.8
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 0.29 9.7 21.7 8.8 21.5 8.0 24.3 6.7 21.4
Laos LAO 0.32 9.7 19.6 8.7 18.4 8.1 21.3 6.5 17.2
Latvia LVA 0.17 1.2 10.2 1.1 10.3 1.3 14.7 1.0 12.2
Lithuania LTU 0.24 4.9 14.2 3.6 12.9 4.4 18.2 2.6 13.6
Luxembourg LUX 0.09 -3.5 5.3 -3.0 6.1 -3.9 9.0 -2.9 7.8
Madagascar MDG 0.42 28.8 50.0 18.5 36.7 28.2 65.9 13.5 33.6
Note: The table shows the the counterfactual increase in real income (in percent) when enforcement costs are
set to the level of the US, or to zero.
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Table 23—: Welfare counterfactuals, by country, in percent
Calibrated θ, Estimated θ,
Estimated dF Calibrated dF
Using z(1) Using z(2) Using z(1) Using z(2)
δ to US to zero to US to zero to US to zero to US to zero
Malawi MWI 1.00 35.1 55.8 14.1 26.8 34.4 66.1 10.8 25.2
Malaysia MYS 0.28 14.2 35.1 9.8 29.7 12.6 44.9 7.1 30.1
Malta MLT 0.36 13.2 24.6 9.7 20.8 10.0 24.4 6.9 19.4
Mauritius MUS 0.17 1.2 7.3 1.2 7.8 1.3 10.7 1.0 8.9
Mexico MEX 0.32 8.1 16.7 5.3 13.5 6.7 19.0 3.7 13.2
Mongolia MNG 0.31 9.7 19.7 7.7 17.5 7.9 21.4 5.6 16.6
Morocco MAR 0.25 8.1 22.3 5.6 19.2 9.6 38.7 3.9 19.9
Mozambique MOZ 1.00 17.7 29.4 7.0 14.6 16.7 34.0 5.2 13.7
Oman OMN 0.14 -0.3 4.6 -0.2 4.8 -0.3 6.8 -0.2 5.8
Namibia NAM 0.36 17.3 34.9 11.1 26.7 14.0 38.6 7.8 25.2
Nepal NPL 0.27 6.0 13.1 5.0 12.5 5.3 15.5 4.0 12.8
Netherlands NLD 0.24 7.1 19.5 5.4 17.6 6.4 24.9 4.1 18.3
New Zealand NZL 0.22 6.4 21.5 4.7 18.9 6.0 28.7 3.5 20.1
Nicaragua NIC 0.27 8.5 22.0 6.0 18.8 7.3 26.2 4.5 19.9
Nigeria NGA 0.32 4.9 9.8 4.0 8.9 4.1 11.1 3.0 8.9
Norway NOR 0.10 -3.3 7.4 -2.7 8.2 -3.6 12.2 -2.6 10.4
Pakistan PAK 0.24 5.4 15.6 4.8 15.3 5.1 20.1 3.9 16.6
Panama PAN 0.50 33.3 54.4 17.5 33.8 23.1 50.1 11.7 29.4
Paraguay PRY 0.30 8.9 20.5 6.0 16.9 7.5 23.7 4.3 16.9
Peru PER 0.36 13.1 27.5 8.8 21.7 10.6 30.6 6.2 20.8
Philippines PHL 0.25 6.9 19.1 5.5 17.7 6.3 24.2 4.0 18.9
Poland POL 0.12 -1.8 10.4 -1.6 11.1 -2.0 16.5 -1.5 14.0
Portugal PRT 0.14 -0.1 10.7 -0.1 11.0 -0.1 16.1 -0.1 13.3
Qatar QAT 0.22 1.9 6.4 1.5 6.0 1.8 8.2 1.2 6.5
Romania ROU 0.20 3.5 14.6 3.4 15.2 3.4 19.8 2.8 17.4
Russia RUS 0.13 -0.8 11.6 -0.7 12.6 -0.8 17.8 -0.6 16.0
Saudi Arabia SAU 0.28 4.7 11.1 3.6 9.9 4.1 13.1 2.7 10.2
Senegal SEN 0.27 6.4 15.9 4.8 14.0 5.7 19.4 3.5 14.5
Singapore SGP 0.18 3.7 23.3 3.0 22.7 3.7 35.1 2.1 23.5
Slovakia SVK 0.26 9.8 26.1 7.2 22.9 8.8 33.7 5.2 23.7
Vietnam VNM 0.31 12.1 25.9 9.9 23.5 10.4 30.2 7.2 22.6
Slovenia SVN 0.20 4.2 18.3 3.3 17.0 4.0 25.5 2.5 18.7
South Africa ZAF 0.33 14.8 31.7 8.9 23.7 12.2 36.4 6.1 22.7
Zimbabwe ZWE 0.32 9.4 19.8 7.5 17.5 7.7 21.5 5.4 16.4
Spain ESP 0.17 1.9 12.8 1.5 12.4 1.9 18.3 1.3 14.3
Sweden SWE 0.31 9.5 19.7 6.4 16.0 7.9 22.6 4.5 15.5
Switzerland CHE 0.21 4.8 16.6 3.6 15.1 4.5 22.4 2.6 16.2
Thailand THA 0.14 -0.1 9.9 -0.1 10.2 -0.1 14.8 -0.0 12.6
United Arab Emirates ARE 0.26 4.2 10.5 3.0 9.1 3.7 12.8 2.1 9.3
Tunisia TUN 0.22 4.6 15.9 3.7 14.9 4.4 21.0 2.9 16.3
Turkey TUR 0.27 7.1 17.1 5.1 15.0 6.2 20.7 3.8 15.6
Uganda UGA 0.45 17.2 31.8 9.7 21.1 13.0 32.2 6.6 19.3
Ukraine UKR 0.41 36.2 78.3 24.9 59.0 24.7 75.0 16.5 54.0
Egypt EGY 0.26 6.1 15.6 5.0 14.8 5.4 19.2 3.7 15.4
United Kingdom GBR 0.22 4.5 14.5 3.5 13.4 4.1 19.1 2.7 14.5
Tanzania TZA 0.14 -0.0 6.9 -0.0 7.0 -0.0 10.1 -0.0 8.3
United States USA 0.14 0.0 9.7 0.0 10.0 0.0 14.7 0.0 12.1
Uruguay URY 0.19 3.1 15.6 2.6 15.2 3.0 22.1 2.0 17.6
Venezuela VEN 0.44 26.0 50.9 14.0 33.3 19.8 53.0 9.3 30.5
Zambia ZMB 0.39 17.3 35.1 9.9 24.5 13.3 37.6 7.0 23.3
Note: The table shows the the counterfactual increase in real income (in percent) when enforcement costs are
set to the level of the US, or to zero.
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